

The German Tribune

Hamburg, 16 July 1989
Twenty-eighth year - No. 1378 - By air

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

C 20725 C
ISSN 0016-8858
DEPOSE A BRX X

East-West changes tilt at the German Question

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

Discussion of the German Question has been resumed, but on what basis? In the light of historical experience? With regard to the actual situation in Europe? Or in accordance with wishful thinking unrelated to reality?

The first point to make is that this fresh interest in the German Question is based on expectations of the future that in themselves are still highly dubious.

The new Soviet foreign policy is seen as leading to changes in East-West relations that will make a new form of co-operation possible across the current borderline in Europe.

As this borderline runs right through Germany, it is only logical to assume that these changes will have a bearing on the German Question.

In other words, if there is a new, dynamic process in Europe, the situation in Germany cannot remain static.

This is where the first mistakes arise. There can be no overlooking the fact that flights of fancy have been mainly triggered by a number of recent Soviet statements on the German Question.

They have amounted to the point that history never says the last word on a subject, from which it follows that history will one day arrive at an answer which differs from the present one. It will, however, have to be left to history to decide.

Such statements at least create the impression that the Soviet Union has a wider vision than from one day to the next.

What is more, they are intended to persuade the Germans to take part in Soviet endeavours to set up a "common European home" as a possible hope for German national aspirations.

But Soviet statements differ the moment they are aimed at others — others, that is, than the Germans.

In France, for instance, Mr Gorbachov said the reunification of Germany was "historically unrealistic." The division of Germany had been "proclaimed" by history as a result of the Second World War.

This change in tone is readily explained. Ambivalent Soviet statements about Germany promptly give rise to fears among our neighbours that the Soviet Union might be prepared to solve the German Question with the Germans alone against everyone else in Europe.

This is an impression the Soviet leader must naturally seek to counteract. The "common European home" would forfeit its magic if, in the long term, it were found to amount to the idea of a German-Soviet alliance.

Mr Gorbachov has no choice but to dispel any such impression; it would show Soviet policy to be basically anti-European. This cannot come as a surprise to us Germans, yet there is one lesson we would do well to have learnt.

It is that the German Question is too important and of such central significance for Europe that it cannot be solved either by the Germans alone or by one power against others.

A further point that must now be made is that it cannot be solved in a Europe of classic nation-states either, and *not on a map of Europe drawn on the* basis of, say, the 1930s.

So much for the prerequisites that must be established in Europe before sensible headway of any kind can be made on the German Question. Nothing the Bavarian CSU leader Theo Waigel can say on the subject at a gathering of ethnic German expellees from Silesia is going to change matters where these points are concerned. The idea that we might be able to set about solving the German Question heedless of our neighbours in Europe is historically immature and deliberately runs counter to changes in Germany because its aggressive approach does not accord with the interests of our European neighbours and is accordingly bound to give rise to alarm. Wishful thinking might also be dispelled by a glance at what we have achieved, and what we have failed to achieve, on the German Question. It is not as though everything has remained static and nothing has changed. For nearly 20 years the Federal Republic has maintained a treaty relationship with the *GDR the declared aim of which is, in* particular, to improve inter-personal, cultural and economic relations between the two German states.

Visits, family and tourist, have increased substantially in both directions, unsatisfactory though the terms may still be.

The governments of both German states, irrespective of their political differences, are engaged in a quest to define points of common, often cross-border interest.

Even in foreign affairs and defence the Federal government has lately taken to assuming responsibility for people in the GDR.

By virtue of its privileged trade ties with the Federal Republic the GDR has long participated in the European Common Market.

What is more, the Federal Republic has heavy economic and financial commitments to the GDR, paying for facilities the GDR ought, but is patently unable, to finance by itself.

Yet all these endeavours have failed so far to achieve one crucial objective. People in the GDR have not gained the least self-determination within their own system.

They have no real say in what happens to them and enjoy no real political freedom even though public pressure on the authorities with this aim in view has steadily gained in intensity.

It is surely not being over-pessimistic to say that any changes in the GDR that might lead to changes in the German Question will not be possible until the change that is, when all is said and done, perceptible in a number of East Bloc countries has been consolidated.

Greater hopes will only be possible once the peoples who hope to regain identities of their own are truly success-

Continued on page 2



President Aquino in Bonn

President Corazon Aquino, of the Philippines, is welcomed to Bonn by President Richard von Weizsäcker. She had wide-ranging talks. (Photo: Sven Simon)



A pair of German aces

Steffi Graf (left) and Boris Becker after their Wimbledon singles championship victories. Graf, 20, won her second title by beating Martina Navratilova, USA, 6-2, 6-7, 6-1 in the final. Becker, 21, beat Stefan Edberg, Sweden, 6-0, 7-6, 6-4. It is the first time Germans have taken both major Wimbledon titles. It is last big tournament still played on grass. (Photo: AP)

IN THIS ISSUE

■ INTERNATIONAL

Pacemakers for change in the East Bloc

Frankfurter Allgemeine

All over Eastern Europe the late-Stalinist version of Leninism is losing its power of control, with Hungary and Poland already turning away from it.

These two countries are surging ahead along the steep and stony path from rule by politbureau and pressure of ideology to a free and democratic system. Is it coincidence that they form the vanguard?

In 1956, a troubled year, the Poles and Hungarians arose to shake off Stalinism by determined action.

Their respective ventures varied in outcome. The Hungarians sought to free themselves entirely from Soviet rule. They took arms against Soviet troops, were defeated and took an awful punishment.

The Poles too were ready to challenge Soviet military might, but their political leaders one stipulated much less exacting demands, while Khrushchov felt a war against Poland might be a much riskier political proposition than a strike against Hungary.

In that European earthquake year the Hungarian and Polish peoples felt closely linked, and for a short while *their political leaders seemed to have* much in common too.

Then the Hungarians, overrun in a reign of terror, were left to their own devices. The Poles realised that gestures of sympathy with the Hungarians would do the Hungarians no good and do themselves, the Poles, nothing but harm.

Later, in the early 1960s and, again, in the early 1970s, the Poles and the Hungarians belonged to different wings of the Soviet camp.

Warsaw was at one with Prague and East Berlin as a bulwark against petty attempts to pursue national communist special roads in foreign and home affairs.

Janos Kadar and Wojciech Jaruzelski may have had some degree of understanding for each other.

But freedom-loving Hungarians made declarations of solidarity with the Polish people, severely restricted by martial law, and that weighed more heavily.

This electoral affinity has roots in history. In the 18th and 19th centuries Poland and Hungary were both victims of neighbouring great powers.

At the end of the 18th century Poland was partitioned by Russia, Prussia and Austria. Uprisings, mainly against the Russian occupying forces, were put down.

Hungary sought to free itself from Austrian rule. Its most strenuous revolutionary efforts in 1848 and 1849 were quashed, again, by Russian troops.

Historic awareness of relations between Poland and Hungary for a long period between the First and Second World Wars is much less pronounced.

At first glance it was a paradoxical proximity, since Poland ranked second only to France as the haughtiest winner of the Great War; Hungary in contrast was its most despised loser.

Yet connecting links existed. Both were badly shaken by budding communism, with Bela Kun and his commissars raging in Hungary for four months, while in Poland the Red Army advanced almost to the gates of Warsaw.

In both countries the traditional hierarchy of landowners and nobility survived. Both were national conservative in outlook. In both, democracy was supplanted by an authoritarian regime.

Both, for that matter, took a strong dislike to Czechoslovakia, which did neither of them any good as they saw it.

In those days Prague was the centre of energy in the area extending from the Soviet Union to Germany, a region then known, and arguably still definable, as *Zwischeneuropa*, or "intermediate Europe."

The instrument it used was the Little Entente, founded and led by Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania were long seen as the Eastern vanguard of the Western way of life, which they were, but maybe more in the mind's eye than in reality.

The world was reminded of their prewar pact when, in summer 1968, Yugoslavia and Rumania spoke out on behalf of Czechoslovakia, first under pressure from, then occupied by the Warsaw Pact.

Rumour had it that the Little Entente had been resurrected. It hadn't. Hungary and Poland, in contrast, took part in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Dubcek's Czechoslovakia.

Was it not an historic irony, many wondered in both Eastern and Western Europe, that these two nations, with their deeply rooted arisocratic traditions, had helped to put down a budding democracy, albeit under duress?

The situation has since changed. Czechoslovakia has marked time, led by late-Stalinist leaders, Rumania has sunk to the level of an oriental despotism, and Yugoslavia labours under a Greater Serbian nationalism tinged with Leninism.

Hungary and Poland, in contrast, have set aside bogus elections and untruth as the mainstay of public life, the monopoly rule of disinformation.

The pace and procedures in these two countries are, admittedly, as varied as their respective conditions and balance of power.

In Poland the energy for change comes mainly from the people; in Hungary the pace is mainly set by the Party leadership.

In Poland the Opposition can rely on the support of a strong and self-assured Roman Catholic Church, whereas Hungarian Catholicism, much weaker, has yet to emerge from its fear, resignation and links with the regime.

Both countries are engaged in a process of finding their own feet by skirting economic abysses, among others.

Late-Stalinists still hold power, and there is no saying how far Soviet tolerance will extend. If the Hungarian and Polish awakening were to end in catastrophe, it would be a catastrophe of European dimensions.

Johann Georg Reissmüller

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 4 July 1989)

A new attitude in France after Gorbachov visit

A few months ago France was one of the European countries most staunchly opposed to convening a CSCE human rights conference in Moscow.

It has since set aside its misgivings and even embarked on a spectacular move, that of proposing, jointly with the Soviet Union, to set up a "European legal environment."

In the past, French diplomats have insisted on judging the Soviet leader's new policy by its results. Paris is now doing what it has so far accused only Bonn of doing: of taking Mr Gorbachov at his word.

The French seem equally unable to resist, in the long run, the dynamism of the change on which the Soviet leader has embarked.

French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas said a "cloudless sky" awaited Mr Gorbachov's two-day visit to Paris, followed by a stopover at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.

President Mitterrand welcomed him with an honour reserved for but a handful of visitors, inviting Mr and Mrs Gorbachov to dinner at his official residence.

Opinion polls show Mr Gorbachov to be held in much the same high esteem in France as in other Western countries.

He comes third on the political popularity scale, trailing President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl but ahead of both President Bush and Mrs Thatcher.

Two Frenchmen out of three approve of him. Nearly one in two takes his disarmament policy seriously. But just as many feel he isn't safely in the saddle.

This proviso testifies to a degree of scepticism that explains why Mr Gorbachov's visit to France was not the media event his visit to the Federal Republic of Germany was.

There can no question of France having been swept by Gorbimania. Even the political class, those whose views colour public opinion, counsel caution, while some even feel a dislike of the fascination exercised by the "great communicator" from the Kremlin.

Conservative hawks such as the Gaullist leader, M. Chirac, and his former Finance Minister, M. Balladur, who sensed a new "spirit of Munich," are by no means alone in warning their fellow-countrymen not to be blinded by the Soviet leader's disarmament proposals.

Voices of warning are sounded in French government ranks too. Premier Rocard, for instance, recently noted that Mr Gorbachov's reforms had yet to be "translated into the military (sector)."

So Mr Gorbachov has triggered less enthusiasm in the land of Descartes than in that of Goethe, partly because many Frenchmen are keen to set themselves apart from the Germans.

Frankfurter Rundschau

Those who warn against German "backsliding" toward Central Europe are bound to take care not to do so themselves.

Yet they also feel that historical experience counsels greater detachment. Many French intellectuals were greatly attracted by the Soviet Union after the war.

The Gulag shock triggered a vigorous anti-communism that coincided with widespread disillusionment among the political class.

Under General de Gaulle, who had renewed the "great and good alliance" with Moscow in 1944, France in the 1960s became the Soviet Union's favourite partner in the West.

De Gaulle's heirs, of all people, are the ones who now incessantly warn against Mr Gorbachov.

Le Monde says disappointment has been general, resulting *only in part* from the fact that France has long been outpaced by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy as a trading partner of the Soviet Union and other East European countries.

This disappointment is arguably due in part to a subliminal sense of insecurity.

The quality of relations between Paris and Moscow is still felt to be in inverse proportion to that of relations between Bonn and Moscow.

Any agreement between Bonn and Moscow on aims and moves in disarmament is bound to give rise to French mistrust.

Paris responds to nothing more allergically than to the Soviet call for French nuclear weapons to be included in the disarmament process.

Mr Gorbachov was *sufficiently* astute not to make the "cloudless sky" overcast by referring to this point *during* his visit.

But everyone knows that his idea of a nuclear weapons-free Europe must inevitably entail scrapping France's *force de frappe*.

One reason why Mr Gorbachov's advocacy of a "common European home" met with greater reservation in Paris than elsewhere was that the French are unable to envisage a state of security that does not include nuclear weapons of their own.

Hans-Hagen Bremer

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 5 July 1989)

The German Tribune
Friedrich Reinecke Verlag GmbH, 3-4 Hartwicusstraße, D-2000 Hamburg 76, Tel.: 22 85 1, Telex: 02-14733.
Editor-in-chief: Otto Heinz. Editor: Alexander Anthony. English language sub-editor: Simon Burnett. — Distribution manager: Georgine Picone.
Published weekly with the exception of the second week in January, the second week in April, the third week in September and the third week in November.
Advertising rates list No. 16
Annual subscription DM 45
Printed by CW Niemeyer-Druck, Hameln
Distributed in the USA by: MASS MAILINGS, Inc., 540 West 24th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011.
Postmaster: send change of address to The German Tribune % MASS MAILINGS.
Articles in THE GERMAN TRIBUNE are translated from the original text and published by agreement with leading newspapers in the Federal Republic of Germany.
In all correspondence please quote your subscription number which appears on the wrapper, between asterisks, above your address.

Continued from page 1

ful in their bid to rid themselves of the straitjacket of past ideological and economic doctrine in the lee of the perestroika Mr Gorbachov has prescribed for the Soviet Union.

Only then will be see how far they are able to take part in wider European cooperation as and when they see fit.

Only then might repercussions occur in connection with the German Question.

It follows that the Federal Republic has every incentive to lend the emancipation movement of nations in Eastern Europe sensible support.

It cannot be helped by over-concentrating on intra-German relations or on the German Question as such.

There is no need for us to be faint-hearted. The German Question will not be forgotten; it is ever-present as far as our neighbours in particular are concerned.

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 9 July 1989)

■ RISE OF THE REPUBLICANS

Force of argument a democrat's most effective weapon, says lawyer

The extreme right-wing Republicans have made spectacular gains in elections this year. They are now represented both in the Berlin assembly and in the European Parliament. Their advance and the reasons for it are the subject of intense examination. You cannot ban them, says Rudolf Wassermann in this article for *Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt*. A ban would be both legally complicated and politically ineffective. He says democrats should try and defeat their opponents by force of argument. Wassermann, who is a regular columnist for the *Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt*, is president of the higher regional court in Brunswick.

Can the Republicans be banned? It is a question which has often been posed in the wake of the electoral successes of this new and extreme right-wing party.

Many people are convinced that such a ban is a matter of political discretion.

But this fails to do justice to the constitutional situation as laid down in the Basic Law.

The German constitution guarantees political parties a privileged position. Even if a party pursues objectives deemed incompatible with the constitution it cannot be banned by the government or by the administration.

Pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law only the Federal Constitutional Court can decide whether or not a party is unconstitutional.

An application for a decision on a party's constitutionality can be filed by the Bundestag, the Bundesrat (second chamber) or the Federal Government.

The political discretionary powers of the organs entitled to file such an application only relate to the decision *whether* an *appeal* is made to the Constitutional Court.

The *decision* on unconstitutionality itself, however, is a legal decision, the nature of which depends on the fulfilment of certain requirements specified in the Basic Law.

The Basic Law stipulates that political parties are only unconstitutional if their objectives or the conduct of their supporters seek to eliminate the free and democratic basic order of German society or jeopardises the continued existence of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Up to now the Constitutional Court has confirmed the unconstitutionality of two political parties.

The first case was the banning of the *Sozialistische Reichspartei* (SRP) during the 50s.

The leading members of this party primarily consisted of former "old campaigners" and Nazis.

The Court took offence at the authoritarian leadership structure of the SRP, claiming that the extent of its renunciation of the principles of democratic organisation could only be interpreted as the expression of a fundamentally anti-democratic attitude.

In the second case the Constitutional Court, again during the 50s, confirmed the unconstitutionality of a political party following an application seeking a ban on the *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* (KPD).

Although the Court underpinned its decision to ban the KPD on grounds of unconstitutionality with numerous documents the Federal Government was never really happy about the ruling.

In all other liberal democracies, for example, Communist parties were allowed to carry out their activities without hindrance despite their revolutionary goals.

As a party which has been declared to be unconstitutional cannot be permitted again at a later date a recommendation was made to the KPD in 1968/69 to re-establish itself as the *Deutsche Kommunistische Partei* (DKP), which is precisely what it did.

This recommendation was based on advice given by the Bonn Justice Minister at that time, Gustav Heinemann.

In the light of this experience with banning political parties it is understandable that the Federal Government and the Bundestag shy away from all too hastily appealing to the Constitutional Court, even if they have doubts about the conformity of certain political parties with the constitution.

The legal obstacles which have to be cleared before unconstitutionality can be confirmed are substantial.

Furthermore, it is fair to question the political meaningfulness of fighting extremists by means of banning their political organisations instead of by means of convincing political arguments.

The same misgivings apply in the case of the Republicans. It is difficult to claim that the party programme and the objectives formulated in other statements by the Republicans endanger the free and democratic basic order of our society.

These documents and statements suggest defining the Republicans as a party of the national right-wing, of which there are similar groupings in other countries of the European Community.

The behaviour of the supporters of the Republicans, on the other hand, provides a greater indication of unconstitutionality.

What is needed, however, is evidence which can stand up in court and which clearly reveals which constitutional principles the Republicans are trying to eliminate or undermine.

The essential features of the Basic Law include respect for the human rights outlined therein, in particular for the right to the free development of one's personality, the sovereignty of the people, the principles of the separation of powers, the accountability of government, the legality of administration and the independence of the courts.

In addition, the multi-party system and equal opportunities for all political parties.

At the instigation of the Interior Ministers of Bavaria and Lower Saxony a preliminary investigation is currently being carried out by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution into whether remarks made by the Republicans violate constitutional principles.

This investigation also extends to links between the Republicans and right-wing extremist and neo-Nazi organisations. The findings of this investigation will determine which further steps will be taken by the government.

The investigation primarily assesses newspapers and pamphlets. Intelligence service methods cannot be employed against the Republicans at this stage of the proceedings. Many feel that this procedure is too lengthy and elaborate.

A state based on constitutional principles, however, is not a taxi from which people can jump off whenever and wherever they see fit.

A state based on the rule of law must also respect the views of those who have differing views.

This also applies to publications which can hardly be described as anything but reactionary and which should be criticised accordingly.

The fact that the Constitutional Court has been liberal in its judgements on unconstitutionality has so far benefited left-wing extremists.

If right-wing extremists now benefit from this approach this is no more than the reverse side of the coin.

German history, however, does call for particular vigilance towards right-wing radicalism and extremism.

Furthermore, exaggerated hopes should not be pinned on the effectiveness of banning a party.

Bismarck's Socialists Act, for example, was unable to prevent the rising popularity of the SPD at that time to the position of the most powerful party in the empire.

In a liberal democracy political conflicts should take place using arguments not bans.

Conflicts with extremists, whether to the right or to the left of the political spectrum, are an acid test for the solidarity of all democrats.

Although there is often talk of such solidarity it tends to disappear at local government level if coalitions with extremist groups can lead to political power.

It would be wrong to criticise all those people who voted for the Republicans as neo-Nazis.

Many, if not the majority, of Republican voters did so because of their disappointment with the established parties.

If people are increasingly disillusioned because political parties with their exaggerated percentage of academic members neglect their interests they have no option but to articulate their protest in elections.

The established parties should try to regain the confidence of the voters who once voted for them but turned to the Republicans this time.

A course adjustment of this kind would be the best way to stop extremist parties before they become a serious danger to the political system.

Rudolf Wassermann

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 30 June 1989)

The extremists cash in on disenchantment

Disenchantment with both the established political parties and with politics is growing. People are becoming increasingly mistrustful of the parties and their representatives.

But the parties have so far done nothing to change their image. There are plenty of empty phrases such as: "We need more citizen's involvement in politics." But there has been no action.

The Republicans and other groupings on the extreme fringe of the democratic spectrum are capitalising on the situation. The established parties, shocked at the Republican gains, do not know how to react — as if it all could not have been predicted!

They are acting as if they themselves are not to blame for much of what has been happening. Yet they are — because of both their generally comfortable attitudes and their strategies, which are aimed at keeping themselves in power.

Politics has degenerated to an increasing extent into an end in itself. The established parties have only taken the needs, fears and problems of many voters seriously if the "issues" concerned could be marketed to improve the party's image.

This may sound malicious and exaggerated. Yet there is some truth in it. The problems facing the Petitions Committee of the Bundestag, for example, reflects the situation.

The Committee, which has 29 members and over 60 other members of staff, presented its 1988 report on 21 June.

The biggest parliamentary committee has complained for many years that it is viewed as a nuisance rather than a help in the machinery of government in Bonn.

Its members, who are chosen from all the political parties represented in the Bundestag, above all feel poorly treated by the Ministries, which often fail to take their activities seriously.

The fact that the Committee now intends making more use of its right to directly summons the Minister concerned if the willingness to cooperate on the part of the ministerial bureaucracy is hesitant gives an idea of the Committee's frustration. But will this help?

The poor reputation of this Committee in the government apparatus and in the political parties is symptomatic.

It cannot be denied that the members of the Committee often know more about the problems facing the man on the street than many Bundestag members, who are rarely able to visit their constituencies because of their numerous other commitments.

If these MPs really take their claim to be representatives of the interests of the people so seriously they should be interested in particularly close cooperation with this Committee.

In our system of parliamentary democracy the Petitions Committee is a link between politics and citizens, the importance of which should not be underrated.

Many politicians have vehemently criticised what they call "atmospheric democracy."

Following the results of the elections in Berlin, Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate and Saarland as well as the European Parliament election, however, they must start asking themselves whether their attempts to keep their distance to the mood of the public bring about exactly the opposite of what they intend.

The election results revealed just how fast political groups on the right-wing and left-wing fringe of the democratic spectrum are apparently able to fill the gaps by sounding out public opinion and exploiting it for their own dangerous ends.

Fred Bilnn

(Saarbrücker Zeitung, 22 June 1989)

■ THE LÄNDER

Berlin's coalition comes through first 100 days

Whatever else can be said to have happened in the first 100 days of the SPD-AL coalition in Berlin (West), Berlin CDU general secretary Landowsky was well wide of the mark in forecasting that "a Red and Green pact of Social Democrats and advocates of chaos, communism and social anarchy" had formed a "loony coalition" that would "pervert the city's entire post-war history."

The Social Democrats and their Alternative List coalition partners have held power in the divided city for 100 days without making any really spectacular mistakes.

True, there were serious May Day riots in Kreuzberg, where the police failed abysmally to keep the situation under control, but Berlin is far from the only city where such mishaps have occurred.

There have been vociferous protests against a 100kph speed limit on the Avus, a section of urban autobahn, motorists arguing that the speed limit deprived them of their "last vestige of freedom."

As most members of the new administration were beginners, there have been a number of minor mishaps, allowing CDU Opposition leader Eberhard Diepgen to refer to "over 100 mistakes in 100 days."

But chaos has not ensued. The new administration can even claim to have notched up a number of successes, which was more than the sceptical Berliners had been expecting.

The readiness of the two, so different coalition parties to join forces has come as a surprise. The way in which they cooperate is complicated, yet their coalition works and has shown itself to be efficient.

The Alternative List has been amazingly quick to learn. It has learnt, for instance, how to accept the eviction of squatters and to condemn the use of force in the Kreuzberg riots.

In the House of Representatives it formally welcomed President Bush's visit to the city even though Christian Ströbele, a former member of their executive committee, had tried to have President Bush's invitation withdrawn.

In return, Chancellor Kohl failed to invite Mayor Momper of Berlin to attend the official dinner held in President Bush's honour in Bonn.

The Alternative List has yet to learn all there is to know, however. "The coalition," said the AL executive committee's Markus Wolf, "has proved in its first 100 days to have an inexorable logic of its own.

"The AL repeatedly finds itself at loggerheads between its position and programme and the need to act and to justify its actions that arises from its coalition status.

"That is inevitable, and there are no simple, easy solutions to this dilemma."

The coalition's other initial success has been its Deutschlandpolitik. Mayor Momper brought back from his visit to GDR leader Erich Honecker permission for West Berliners to make "off-the-cuff" visits to surrounding areas of the GDR from August.

Nor is that all. Consideration is being given to new border crossing points and to joint traffic arrangements. At the end of May the GDR proposed in writing an entire catalogue of projects and new ideas.

These are developments that have not been unsolicited or come like a bolt out of the blue. For years Social Democrats led by SPD left-winger Harry Ristock have conferred with members of the ruling party in East Berlin, constantly viewed with suspicion by the CDU.

These talks have finally begun to pay dividends, encouraged by the international political configuration and by changes in the socialist camp.

The first 100 days of a new administration are not just a "close season;" they are a honeymoon too, and the honeymoon is clearly drawing to its somewhat less starry-eyed close.

The Alternative List seems only superficially to have come to terms with its new role as a coalition party.

It abides by the terms agreed in coalition talks, but more and more members have come to feel that the AL as they know it — and want it to be — is not cut out to serve on the government benches.

Lacking a consistent ideology, the AL's programme consists of a wide range of individual issues on which factions seek to distinguish themselves by means of minor skirmishes that seem more likely petty squabbles.

Some are even starting to ask, strictly rhetorically and in connection with minor issues, whether the coalition might not be called into question.

"Depending which borough party was affected by the proposals drafted," one AL councillor says, "Alternative List decisions have veered one way or the other, which is a lethal state of affairs for a coalition party."

Some, like Christian Ströbele, are busy testing how far they can play with fire before the coalition is sacked.

One of the coalition terms agreed was that the House of Representatives would in general ratify Federal legislation, in keeping with the city's status.

For the Social Democrats that was one of three essentials. Herr Ströbele was one of the Alternative List signatories of the coalition agreement.

He and others recently called on the AL parliamentary party to refuse to ratify security legislation passed by the Federal government, which would have been a breach of a coalition agreement cornerstone before its first 100 days were over.

The parliamentary party preferred to stand by the terms of its coalition agreement and voted to a man in favour of ratification.

So both parties will need to put in more practice before their internal relationship can really be rated stable.

Problems seem sure to lie ahead for the Red and Green coalition in its effect on voters. "Ecologically oriented urban renewal," a cornerstone of coalition policy, is hard to popularise.

Opposition has not been limited to protests against the 100kph speed limit on the Avus. Plans to close forest roads to motor vehicles or to scrap city-centre bus lanes have also come under fire.

Surveys may show that the people of Berlin feel environmental protection is the most pressing political task, but they are quick to resent its implementation and reluctant to forgo habits to which they have grown accustomed.

Besides, "ecologically oriented urban renewal" seems to concentrate on small beer. The policy decision to dispense with large-scale projects such as further sections of urban autobahn or to suggest building the German Historical Museum on a less grandiose scale can backfire.

It tends to create the impression that nothing much is happening in Berlin any more and that the city council is concerned mainly with the quality of life in unprepossessing inner-city areas and on minor details.

Opposition leader Diepgen skilfully and consistently argues that the ruling coalition of Reds and Greens is in the process of making West Berlin provincial.

This is a shrewd line of argument when one bears in mind how anxious Berlin people have always been to be the biggest and best. Even so, the coalition might well end its first 200 days looking unspectacularly like any other city council.

Not particularly exciting, eh? Yet who would have expected that 100 days ago?

Otto Jörg Weis

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 24 June 1989)

A new mayor outlines his blueprint

Social Democrat Volker Hauff, Bonn Transport Minister under Helmut Schmidt, has been elected mayor of Frankfurt.

Fifty councillors voted for him as mayor, 41 against. Between them his Social Democrats and the Greens have exactly 50 seats in the new council.

They joined forces when the Christian Democrats lost their absolute majority at the polls in March.

The 35 CDU councillors voted against Herr Hauff. The six NPD (extreme right-wing) councillors voted for a candidate of their own.

Mayor Hauff said in his inaugural speech that his aim was to promote a political culture based on liberalism and tolerance.

He wanted to arrive at the "best solution" for Frankfurt, which was to go its own way. He wasn't interested in establishing a "counterweight" to the CDU-FDP *Land* or Federal governments.

Outlining "guiding principles" for his term as mayor, he advocated a "reform policy of social and ecological renewal" that was to be based on what was tried and trusted rather than thrust upon the city.

He was keen to promote "dynamic development" yet anxious to ensure that growth did not assume the proportion of a threat to the people of Frankfurt.

The single European market would give Frankfurt an opportunity of vying with Paris as the foremost Continental metropolis. Jointly with representatives of the business community he planned to "draw up strategies" to ensure that Frankfurt was chosen as the location of the European central bank.

Frankfurt was to become an "important meeting place in the common European home." Its role as a turntable of trade must be boosted, as must ties with Eastern Europe and the Far East.

Herr Hauff felt that Frankfurt as an international commercial centre enjoyed a special responsibility. It boasted a potential that might make the spirit of a united Europe more readily apparent than elsewhere.

That was why Frankfurt must become a European metropolis. Mayor Hauff combined this announcement with a policy decision to "dispense with German national pathos."

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 16 June 1989)

■ PERSPECTIVE

Three-nation forum looks at life with the East Bloc



A conference of experts rarely comes to an end with both a sense of satisfaction and a feeling that the conference has fallen short of its mark.

The conference organised by the Konrad Adenauer foundation on the policy of the West towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which was held in the All Souls College in Oxford and focused on the "Europeanisation of the Ostpolitik", was marked by such ambivalence.

A desire for further talks of this kind, for example, was accompanied by doubts about their meaningfulness.

After all, what can a few members of parliament, a few researchers on East Bloc countries, a few business community experts and correspondingly well-versed journalists achieve?

The conference in Oxford chose the Europeanisation of Ostpolitik, a future task for the Community, as its axiom.

As opposed to bilateral conferences, of which there is an abundance, an Anglo-Franco-German conference on such a topic is a relative novelty.

Three dozen or so experts practised the art of "brainstorming" with respect to events in Eastern Europe, especially in the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary.

These countries are the economically "sick men" in the Communist camp and the political motors of change.

The conclusion drawn by one French conferee that the economically powerful East Bloc members (the GDR, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia) represent a rearguard of reform is possibly based on a misunderstanding.

They only appear to be powerful because they have not opened Pandora's box in Gorbachov style.

There was general agreement at the conference that the lack of freedom is the reason for the sorry state of Communist worldwide and that the answer to problems is political rather than economic reform.

In this respect it was easy to find common ground between the Germans, the French and the British, even though the underlying reasoning and, even more so, the conclusions drawn reflected the traditional ways of thinking in these differing nations.

The British stance was characterised by a businesslike interest, a curious openness, and yet a pronounced scepticism regarding the possibility of reform in a Communist system.

The chairman of the Committee for Trade and Industry and chairman of the British-Soviet parliamentary group, Kenneth Warren, was the exception from this rule.

He warned against faintheartedness by the West and emphatically recommended appreciable aid for Gorbachov — in addition to the roughly $130bn in loans the West has already given to Communist countries.

The French revealed a rational and realistic historically-based approach, which was brilliantly formulated by an MP belonging to Giscard d'Estaing's UDF, Alain Lamassoure.

Without ifs and buts Lamassoure formulated the task of a European Ostpolitik as follows: "Europe needs German unity."

The Germans also lived up to their reputation of being guided by more optimistic assessments and emotions.

This position was perhaps most typically represented by Volker Rühe (CDU), who gave an additional dimension to the concept of security in line with the motto "Trust the Germans" (in allusion to an article written by a British journalist entitled "Don't trust the Germans!" which was reprinted in this newspaper):

"If a Communist party is willing to go into opposition, if thousands of Soviet students come to the West, if Hungary reappraises the events of 1956 — this is significant for security in Europe."

Rühe's statement culminated in the formula that Ostpolitik is a kind of burden-sharing and that this is in the overall strategic interest of the alliance.

Above all, however, the German question has arisen anew, at the latest when changes occur in the GDR.

Rühe thus addressed a subject which had not been discussed up until that time: the role of the Germans, the future of Germany, the objectives of Ostpolitik and the European context.

Rühe also warned authorities on this subject in the West that enthusiasm for reforms in the East and freezing the German problem are mutually incompatible.

The British MP Quentin Davies observed a similar mood.

A certain something is in the air, something which is only unconsciously revealed but which is nonetheless noticeable.

It is otherwise difficult to understand why high-ranking officials in the Bonn Chancellery feel obliged to remind their western friends of the treaties of 1955, in which there is a commitment to help the Germans attain the objective of unity (in peace and freedom).

Some conferees in Oxford, however, virtually demanded that the Germans sever their special economic ties with the GDR, and discontinue their deutschmark "subsidies" (a reference to the lump-sum payments demanded by the GDR for transit traffic, the postal and telecommunications system, etc.), since this contributes towards stabilising the East German regime.

There was also a discernible feeling of uneasiness about Bonn's Ostpolitik.

Timothy Garton Ash, a clever journalist and an excellent authority on Poland, posed the question of the whys and wherefores and, like the French, of the exact meaning of the concept of a "European peace order."

He voiced his suspicion that this is a specifically German concept, even though the idea was first forwarded in the 1967 Harmel Report.

It is true, however, that a European Ostpolitik is just as non-existent as an exact definition of the content of a "European peace order."

The observation that the Germans have shaped the main direction of a special policy towards East Bloc countries is also true and easy to explain.

No other Western European state has such special interests in the East and no political objective is so closely linked with the establishment of a European peace order than German unification.

Against this background the explosive nature of a concept of a "Europeanisation" of Ostpolitik is obvious.

Should the Europeans adopt German Ostpolitik and, in line with Lamassoure's statement, pursue the unification of the Germans?

Should Europeanisation mean putting a chain on the Germans or diluting their Ostpolitik to the point of harmlessness?

Should Europeanisation, beyond the intentions of Egon Bahr, signify a "Westernisation" of the German policy and a commitment of this policy to a common western line of approach?

One of the major questions is who determines this line of approach?

The "joint declaration" between Moscow and Bonn signed on the occasion of Mikhail Gorbachov's visit to Bonn revealed the misunderstandings, the lack of understanding and the shortcomings in cooperation in this field.

The French apparently have more problems stomaching this declaration than the British.

Renate Fritsch-Bournazel came from Paris with the French version of the declaration, in which many passages were underlined.

She was absolutely incensed at the fact that Russians and Germans "invite" (in the original German text the word *auffordern* implies greater insistence) the other Europeans to work together towards overcoming the division of Europe.

How dare the Germans sign the demand for a ban on nuclear tests and thus violate British, French and American security interests?

Madame Fritsch-Bournazel was not the only person to ask such questions.

Surely the particularly close cooperation between Bonn and Paris could have resolved such problems before the text of the declaration was published.

Believe it or not, there is no such cooperation in this field.

There was neither discussions between the Germans and the French (or others) at the level of Foreign Ministry experts, nor were respective sides asked to give their opinion.

And all this despite the fact that the text was announced during Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow in October 1988.

On the other hand, the Germans failed to give any examples of how a future "Europeanisation" of Ostpolitik could be shaped.

They were simply afraid that the text could become known too soon and then heavily criticised.

There is not only mutual mistrust, but also mutual fear of indiscretion.

Uwe Kästner, the head of the West-East department in the Bonn Chancellery, made the perhaps most forward-looking contribution to the conference.

Instead of just bewailing the lack of coordination he outlined concrete steps towards improving this situation.

He called for a permanent Community representation of Western European policies and the extensive political cooperation between Community member states.

He called for a coordination of diplomatic visits to the East by the West and a concrete coordination of all political and economic ventures with Eastern Europe.

And he underlined that the future European Ostpolitik will cost money and that there should not be a division of labour along the lines: some talk big while the others stand the rounds.

Eduard Neumaier

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 30 June 1989)

■ BUSINESS

Too big, too rich, too powerful: growing pressure to hit commercial banks

The power of the commercial banks is coming under increasing scrutiny. Focus has been sharpened by the continued expansion and diversification of Daimler-Benz from motor vehicles into armaments and aerospace to the point where, if its latest takeover bid is allowed, it will control almost 4 per cent of Germany's GNP.

Deutsche Bank, Germany's biggest, is the biggest shareholder in Daimler-Benz. The fears are that Deutsche Bank's influence is now almost uncontrollable.

In May, the Social Democrat party raised the issue in the Bundestag. Public opinion was solidly behind the move. The immediate reason for the SPD step was the cost of home mortgages, which are much more expensive in Germany than elsewhere in the European Community.

The question of banks and their influence has been cropping up regularly for 20 years but nothing concrete has happened.

But this time, things seem different. All parliamentary parties have let it be known that they want limits put on what the banks can do. There are three factors here:

- the banks' shareholdings;
- a bank's right to vote on behalf of customers' deposited securities at a company meeting (proxy votes);
- bank executives holding too many appointments on supervisory boards.

The main concern is the power the banks hold in their hands by an accumulation of these factors. It is irrelevant whether they are abused. There are chances to exercise influence there over which there is no control.

If a clear division were to be established between credit business and dealing in stocks and shares, it would mean an end to the German universal bank in favour of the banking system usual in English-speaking countries which have credit banks on one side and securities houses and stockbrokers on the other).

But this was rejected by the commission investigating the structure of the country's banking in 1979.

The experience of the October 1987 crash, when broking houses in the USA and Britain went bankrupt and there were mass sackings in the securities sector, proved that the universal bank, due to the chance it gives of balancing out risks, did have its advantages.

German stock exchanges have been spared the growth of company takeovers, which have been seen on stock exchanges in English-language speaking countries over the past few months, due in part to the strong position of the banks.

No-one today is interested in the functions of the universal bank system, developed over time and proven to be of value, although a greater part of the banks' power has resulted from this.

The limitation of the banks' shareholdings does not solve the problem of power, it would probably intensify it. The SPD and a CDU/CSU parliamentary discussion group on medium-sized company affairs have called for limitations of five per cent. The cartel authorities recommended this level in 1973/1974 and again in 1986. Count Otto Lambsdorff, chairman of the FDP, has suggested 15 per cent.

RHEINISCHER MERKUR

The 15-per-cent demand seems to be a feint. Count Lambsdorff is chairman of the German Association for Protection of Security Holdings and as such is intimate with the shareholding percentages of banks.

He knows well enough that there are not many bank shareholdings which are more than 15 per cent of the total equity and, with the exemption of Daimler-Benz, none of real economic significance.

Is, for example, a 50 per cent shareholding in Hutschenreuther in Schwandorf, manufacturers of fine ceramics, harmful to the economy as a whole?

Would a great deal be altered if the Deutsche Bank reduced its shareholding in the Karstadt department store chain from 25 to 15 per cent?

The banks could live well from a limitation of 15 per cent. Only in two instances does the Commerzbank have a holding greater than 15 per cent.

The banks point out that the origins of many of their holdings in companies came about when the company in question was in a difficult position. That does not explain permanent shareholdings admittedly.

But on the other hand there seems to be a readiness to hand to reduce holdings, without any prompting from the law, if only the possibility existed to utilise undisclosed reserves, exempt from taxation, for equipment and facilities investment.

A change of taxation legislation to this effect would probably be more useful than all the vehement demands for a limitation of banks' holdings in other companies.

Count Lambsdorff has called for tax relief of this sort. Time-limited regulations for exceptions must be enacted however, making it possible for banks to step in when it is a question of reorganising an ailing company, if priority is to be given to legal limitations.

The rescue of Klöckner & Company by the Deutsche Bank, for instance, would have been impossible if there had been a limitation of the bank's holding to 15 per cent.

It is easier to demand for changes to a bank's right to proxy voting at a company meeting than it is to put this into effect.

Great hopes were placed for more shareholder democracy as a result of the wrestling which lawyers and experts in stocks and shares went through for a regulation which amended shareholding legislation and which came into effect in 1965 — in vain.

The vast majority of shareholders gave the banks no precise instructions, giving to them in effect a free hand at company annual meetings.

The banks cannot be blamed here, but the increase in influence cannot be talked away.

To this can be added the fact that a bank, which can exercise influence on a lot of companies via its own shareholding and proxy voting rights, is itself uncontrollable.

Deutsche Bank manages more than half of its voting rights itself at the bank's annual general meetings. It is true that voting rights at annual general meetings have become a farce.

The results are similar to elections in totalitarian states: 99 per cent in favour of managements' proposals.

What alternatives were offered? Should the bank vote only at the specific instruction of a shareholder? Then the danger arises that due to a lack of instructions and a poor turnout "accidental" majorities are recorded.

Or should there be a top limit to the number of proxy votes held by one person or organisation?

Count Lambsdorff turns to the law. His Association for the Protection of Security Holdings has for years condemned the practice of various companies of limiting voting rights for protection against outside influences.

The most difficult to understand is the problem of one person holding many appointments to supervisory boards.

The SPD has demanded reducing membership of supervisory boards from ten to five per individual.

But does it make any difference whether in place of a top manager a representative from the second management level takes over the bank's position on the supervisory board?

Major companies would easily be in a position to replace executive board members with directors. This would then strengthen the influence of the major companies.

The SPD rightly see as an outrage that bank representatives could be on the supervisory boards of competing companies.

But this is not just a banking problem. It afflicts trades unions as well. Franz Steinkühler, head of the engineering union, IG Metall, controls Daimler-Benz and VW.

Leo Fischer

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 30 June 1989)

Daimler-Benz reshuffles component parts

Daimler-Benz shareholders voted by a massive 99 per cent to approve restructuring the group. The change has been prompted by the rapid expansion of the group into defence technology and aerospace.

A new holding company called Daimler-Benz AG will have under it: Mercedes-Benz AG (motor vehicles); AEG (electricals and electronics); and Deutsche Aerospace.

Daimler-Benz has made some spectacular acquisitions (AEG, Dornier, MTU and, in all probability, MBB as well). In so doing the company has expanded from car making to new dimensions on land, sea, in the air and in space.

The change is intended to make the group easier to control. Both the chief executive, Edzard Reuter, and supervisory board chairman Alfred Herrhausen — who is also head of Deutsche Bank, Mercedes-Benz's biggest shareholder — have both worked hard for this restructuring.

Despite the voting success, senior group strategists did not see the annual meeting, in Berlin, as a walkover. The marathon meeting, lasting almost 11 hours, showed this.

Apart from the inclination of a few shareholders to hold forth the meeting kept to the facts and discussions were very serious.

Reuter was given much praise for his speech, but it was followed by a plethora of probing questions.

The fear running through the meeting was that by this show of strength the group would be overstraining itself. This was aimed, of course, at the specific Daimler ambitions for MBB and the Airbus.

Reuter had to use all his powers of convincing to purge doubts about the influence shareholders would have, the stability of the car business, involvement of the group in South Africa and the balance of activities.

Naturally, in view of the group's new structure, shareholders feared that they would not be able to get involved, as they have been able to do in the past, in the nucleus of the group, the newly-organised Mercedes-Benz AG, which generates three-quarters of turnover.

Reuter, prudently creating confidence, pointed to "the current legal discussion on this point." He will have to be measured by the yardstick of the promises he gave. He said that information would be provided to, and contacts maintained with, shareholders in the decision-making process, "when this was legally necessary."

The formal act of the annual meeting to give the new group structure the green light, marks an important step on the way for Daimler-Benz to becoming a technology organisation.

So as not to lose time there has been no holding back. From the beginning of this year work has been carried out at all levels as if this new "approach" had been approved.

For Mercedes-Benz, "the youngest of the car manufacturers with the longest tradition," the difficulties caused by the new division of responsibilities were overcome with relatively little difficulty.

This was true also for AEG if one disregards the separation of a few growth-oriented areas.

It will be a Herculean task to deal with the newly established Deutsche Aerospace AG. This company will act as an intermediate holding company and will bring together under its umbrella Dornier, MTU and the aviation, space and defence technology activities hived off from AEG.

But that is not all. Munich-based Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm, the aviation and space organisation, has to be welded into this organisation, if, as is to be expected, the Economic Affairs Minister gives his go ahead.

A decision is necessary for the continuous discussion on this theme is irritating. It has lasted too long already. The elan with which Daimler-Benz, due to its financial clout, has made acquisitions and taken on new tasks, is for some impressive, but it makes others dizzy or anxious.

There should be no more carping about the group's strategic aim of looking for future opportunities in the widest possible area of growth.

Werner Neitzel

(Die Welt, Bonn, 30 June 1989)

■ BUSINESS

From lecture hall to the boardroom

You can't be both, Peter Eyerer was warned when he decided to be both a teaching scientist and a businessman. Both his jobs are in the *Land* of Baden-Württemberg, which is one of the leading high-tech regions in Germany. Here the links between academe and industry are closer than in most other *Länder*. Harald Günter reports for *Die Welt*.



Double life suits him... Peter Eyerer. (Photo: Die Welt)

Peter Eyerer is a professor of materials science at Stuttgart University and a part-time executive.

The paper sheets on the easel in his office, which is decorated in teak and black leather, are covered with formulae and sketches. Eyerer, 48, is dressed in an expensive suit. He looks athletic.

But he spends only one day a week here on the executive floor of the Pebra company in Altbach near Esslingen. The rest of his time he spends in the laboratory or lecture hall.

He is a professor with a degree in engineering. His main occupation is his chair for materials science and his directorship of the institute for materials testing and science at Stuttgart University.

He is also an author. In *Spurwechsel* he describes the experiences of a scientist who renounces the ivory tower of the academic world for the battlefield of the real world, giving extraordinary life to the expression "technology transfer".

His step was daring: from July 1985 until July 1988 he took sabbatical leave and became an executive in industry.

He has now returned to teaching and doing research work at his university, but he has remained faithful to Pebra Paul Braun GmbH, which supplies parts to the car industry. For three years he was their engineering manager, adviser and project leader.

Everyone is pleased with the way the arrangement worked out.

But it was not always like that. When his colleagues at Stuttgart University heard of his intentions they said, "either you remain fully committed to the university or you change over to industry without any reinsurance. You can't have it both ways."

In his new firm he was seen as an intellectual and there were reservations about his move into industry. He wrote in his book: "Defence mechanisms are deployed to isolate or repel foreign bodies."

His students reacted in quite a different manner. In three anonymous surveys 70 per cent saw his digression in a positive light. Only five per cent of those questioned took the view that his action had more disadvantages than advantages.

There are a few facts which should be mentioned. He did not break off his links to the university totally during his absence (unpaid). He spent one or two days a week at the university, without remuneration, giving encouragement to the 50 workers at the institute and fulfilling a half of his lecturing commitments as a professor. "It was not a piece of cake," he said.

What was the aim of this experiment, not before undertaken anywhere in the Federal Republic?

Eyerer, a mechanical engineer with eight years experience in industry, was made a full professor in 1979. His materials institute has an international reputation and it is financially sound because of the commissions it receives from industry.

At the time he wrote: "Nevertheless I was dissatisfied." He felt that not enough demands were being made of him in a practical-creative sense.

He said that at the university the ability "to solve problems of application quickly and effectively was lost in time." He said that he had got out of practice and could not train his students well enough how to deal with practical problems. He added that his personality "was only developing to a limited extent as well."

Eyerer sought and found a way out at Altbach. The Pebra company employs in all 2,700 in nine works. They produce external parts for the bodywork of cars, either made of metal or plastics. They made radical changes in the mid-1980s.

One workshop was under a lot of pressure from the competition. In the course of expansion in handling plastics it had got to the limits of its technical know-how.

Eyerer said that it was suggested that know-how should be brought in from outside, from Eyerer in fact, an acknowledge expert in synthetics materials.

Stuttgart University had nothing against this, and the Ministry responsible equally gave its approval.

Lothar Späth, Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg, obviously had nothing against this. He is the state's most senior advocate of the exchange of knowledge and experience between universities and industry.

The change from university to industry took place on 1 July 1985. Eyerer, three of his institute colleagues in tow, became a member of the Pebra management.

He built up a new engineering division which united development, design, quality control, plant procurement and planning.

Under Eyerer's influence part of the production was rearranged and machinery renewed, a new laboratory was set up, and Europe's most modern technical school for spraying was put into operation. A foam process, developed in 1967, polyurethane technology, was developed.

For the layman this means that the end product develops through chemical reactions in a casting mould. This is more versatile, cheaper, more stable and can be sprayed better than conventional thermoplastics. During his three years with the company Eyerer was paid a manager's salary, which was much more than his professor's pay.

But this paid off for the company. New contracts came from Munich, Untertürkheim, the home of Mercedes-Benz near Stuttgart, Ingolstadt, Weissach and Rüsselsheim, as well as from the US, Sweden

Continued on page 14

The Stuttgarter behind the wheel in Sao Paulo

Wolfgang Sauer has retired after 28 years in the electricals and motor industries in Brazil. The 59-year-old who was born in Stuttgart went to Brazil in 1961 and became a Brazilian in 1982.

He says: "I don't want to be holding on to a walking stick when I meet my successor."

His first jobs in Brazil were with the electricals companies of Bauknecht and Bosch. In 1973 he went to Volkswagen do Brazil as its chief executive. When VW merged with Ford's Brazilian subsidiary in 1987, he became head of the new combined company, Autolatina, based in Sao Paulo.

With a staff of 50,000 and a yearly production run of 546,000, it has 60 per cent of the Brazilian market and is the largest car maker in South America.

As head of VW, Sauer he became a well-known figure throughout the country, partly through his frequent appearances on television.

Sauer, a dashing figure of a man, hit the headlines in 1987 when Autolatina became embroiled in the battle with the then Brazilian Finance Minister, Luiz Bresser Perreira, over pricing. The affair ended ended in the supreme court — with Autolatina the winner.

Those were "my darkest hours," Herr Sauer said, a powerfully-built man with light brown hair whom we met on a rainy day at the Group's headquarters on the outskirts of Sao Paulo, a metropolis with 12 million people.

"A businessman is not happy when he sees his name constantly in the newspapers, particularly in an affair like that," he said.

A captain of industry in the Third World needs a thick skin. He must know something about crisis management, be able to improvise and react swiftly to situations.

The economic situation rarely remains stable. Politics frequently influences economic development. "I gained a lot of experience there," he stressed.

Volkswagen do Brazil went though every kind of experience. For 20 years, from the company's foundation in 1953 until 1973, business just went upwards all the time. The largest foreign subsidiary of a West German company was a showpiece which brought in rich profits for the parent company in Wolfsburg.

Then Brazil staggered into the first oil crisis and suddenly the upward trend came to an end. The golden days were gone, never to return.

Internal sales problems forced the company to turn to exports. Sauer, in whose office there is a large globe, went all over the world.

He discovered a lucrative market in Iraq: 150,000 cars from Brazil were shipped to the country. Exports now account for 28 per cent of turnover.

In the 1970s the government ordered a change from petrol-powered to alcohol-powered engines. But then the oil price slumped and the government decided to cut back the expensive alcohol-engine project.

Autolatina had to reduce production of alcohol engines (60 per cent of production). Sauer says the alcohol project was not a mistake: "It made it possible to modernise agriculture and create new jobs. It is always possible to convert back when oil prices rise drastically."

The end of the military regime in 1985 and the beginning of democracy, "the New Republic," drove the country into a period of unpredictability.



A household figure... Wolfgang Sauer. (Photo: Autolatina)

Measures to stabilise the situation failed because they pursued electioneering goals. President José Sarney has had to dismiss three Finance Ministers.

In 1988 the inflation rate reached 930 per cent. This year it is likely to hit 1,000 per cent.

A populist congress has created a constitution which gives a man time off from work on becoming a father, decrees a plebiscite for a return of the monarchy and cuts off domestic sectors of industry such as computers from foreign competition.

Sauer: "Mad legislation, which not only harms the automobile industry but *the country as a whole. It protects outdated technology.*"

The most irritating aspects have been the constant price decrees. "Our politicians have not yet learned that democracy also includes the economy. The state should concentrate on education, health, the infrastructure and energy, not pursue a pricing policy. What will that achieve?"

Brazil's infamous bureaucracy means that constant contact with government is needed. Sauer constantly commuted between Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia.

There was always a helicopter waiting on the roof of Autolatina headquarters to take him to Congonhas Airport where a company jet was standing by.

Many problems were solved over breakfast, lunch or a "cafezinho" with an influential person.

The expression "Jeito," meaning trick is the word used to describe the Brazilian art of compromise. Sauer is a master at this.

He is a Swabian by birth, a Brazilian by nationality. He is optimistic about the future.

On Autolatina he said: "This is a unique experiment which has paid off, a holding company for the second and fourth largest car company in the world."

He mentioned the word rationalisation. He said that cooperation between the two had been harmonious, the initial problems had been overcome. Only in 1987 did the group show a loss. It was in the black by 1988.

Volkswagen still has 40 per cent of the market, Ford 20 per cent. The successor to the Beetle, the Golf, is the top selling car in Brazil.

In October the first Apollos and Veronas will be rolling off the production line, the first vehicles developed jointly.

The network of dealers (1,200) and suppliers (4,000) has remained constant.

Continued on page 11

■ RESEARCH

The story of how the unusually curvaceous Z-DNA was photographed naked

The Nobel Prize-winning electron tunnel microscope has proved extremely versatile. Research scientists can use it to investigate and manipulate both crystals and molecules.

Physicist Ulrich Köhler sees his electron microscope as just one of the tools of his trade. He came across it in a US laboratory and brought the technology back with him to Hanover University.

All the layman can see of the microscope is two strips of what looks like brown cardboard a few centimetres long, a minor detail in a stainless steel structure 50cm tall.

Where they meet at a right angle, a wire points upward, severed by clippers. It is the "eye" through which, with luck and patience, individual atoms can be seen.

Below this wire, concealed by a strip of metal, a third strip of "cardboard" stands vertically on the other two.

Between them they link a three-dimensional system of coordinates. Cardboard brown in colour, they are in fact piezo-crystals and grow longer or shorter under the influence, as it were, of an electric current.

Physicists can manoeuvre the "eye" by means of these movements.

Köhler is a solid-state physicist. He shares the interest that led, 10 years ago, to the invention of the tunnel microscope by Heinrich Rohrer and Gerd Binnig in their Zürich laboratory.

What, they wondered, are crystals like? How are their surfaces really arranged? Does the atomic arrangement of, say, silicium really correspond to the theories devised by physicists?

Rohrer and Binnig were awarded the 1986 Nobel physics prize for their research. They and many fellow-physicists have since developed their microscope into an increasingly sophisticated instrument.

It supplies spectacular pictures of not only metallic surfaces in atomic detail but even individual molecules, including DNA.

Based on an ingeniously simple principle, the tunnel microscope has proved an extremely versatile guide to the microcosm.

Binnig and Rohrer wanted to probe crystals with a very fine tip. They harnessed the tunnel effect.

An electron can be made to jump from a single atom at the end of the wire and across a gap to the surface under scrutiny — and to do so even though it lacks the motive force, the energy needed.

This paradox is due to the nature of elementary particles. They aren't what you or I might think of as particles. They are waves, diffuse objects, and we can never tell exactly where they are.

When an electron wants to jump, a powerful counter-force can make it unlikely, but never unable, to do so.

Even without tunnels to guide them, a sufficiently powerful electric current can wrest electrons from matter.

This brutal procedure admittedly destroys the object the physicist is trying to observe.

The tip of the microscope must plough one furrow after another across the crystal surfaces under scrutiny to enable scientists to map them.

The tip does not touch the crystal, however. Electric power between needle and surface triggers a current of tunnel electrons.

A computer runs the needle across microscopic hills and dales, raising or lowering it just enough to keep the tunnel current constant.

The tip thus keeps a constant distance of a few atom diameters from the surface under investigation.

To learn more about a single atom you have to bring the tip of the tunnel to a standstill and boost the electric current.

That is how physicists measure what they call the atom's colour: the energy level of its outer electrons, an array that is characteristic of the atoms of a chemical element.

What the microscope converts into images is not, strictly speaking, atoms and molecules. The instrument "sees" a surface of equal charge density and reproduces it as a wavy "landscape."

The density of the charge and thus of the electrons may depend on the atoms, but not always so that a hill takes shape over each atomic nucleus with a dale in between.

When Columbia University research scientists in New York ran the tunnel tip over a tantalum disulphide crystal, what they saw was a regular hill-and-dale land scape, but the hills were three to six times further apart than the atoms could possibly have been.

The microscops can only distinguish individual atoms when its tip is narrowed to the width of a single atom. There are two ways of doing so. Either the patient research scientist rams the tip into the surface under scrutiny "on spec," as it were. The furthest point of the tip will then consist of the material under investigation.

DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT

Or he boosts the electric charge in a bid to arrive at the tapered shape required. A few volts between needle and surface generate an enormous electric field, the distance being so minute. Surplus material evaporates.

The tapered tip of a tunnel microscope can be used both to observe and to manipulate, to describe lines or patterns.

Scientists at Jülich nuclear research centre, for instance, have traced outlines on gold. The needle can describe signs and symbols.

Research scientists feel they will soon be able to store between 1,000 and 10,000 times more information than hitherto on a given surface.

Physicists John Foster, Jane Frommer and Patrick Arnett of the IBM research centre in San Jose, Cal., have used the tunnel tip as a scalpel, dissecting an organic molecule.

They placed a drop of diethylhexylphthalate, an organic compound, on a graphite surface and dipped the needle into it.

Thirty millivolts were passed through the organic fluid, making the carbon crystal visible. Just under four volts then fixed a diethylhexylphthalate molecule to the graphite. A second charge unfixed it.

Scientists refer to these processes as writing and erasing, visualising them as information storage.

They even feel they have, on several occasions, split one of these characters. That would be the first deliberate chemical reaction brought about in connection with a single molecule.

Tunnel microscopy has one major disadvantage. It only works with substances that conduct electricity. In non-conductors, including all organic substances, the electrons are too closely bound to the atoms for an electric current to flow.

Yet individual compounds laid out on a conductive surface influence surface charge density so much that shadow outlines are apparent.

In bulky molecules that rise several atomic layers from the "plain" this contrast is not particularly revealing, however, and there is no way in which the leaf of a plant, for instance, can be examined in this way.

When Paul Hansma and fellow-physicists at the University of California tried to do so, the microscope simply pushed the tunnel tip through to its customary distance from the conductive underlay.

In view of this problem scientists first thought in terms of coating organic compounds in metal and then sounding out the casts from within.

Another approach has already proved successful. Organic material has been clad in a very thin metallic layer and the metal been probed from the outside by the tunnel tip.

That is how University of California scientists took their exciting photograph of a DNA double helix, the chemical carrier of genetic information.

It made headline news last spring. In early June Minnesota University biochemists came up with pictures of a naked biomolecule, the unusually curvaceous Z-DNA.

There is, however, no movement in metal-clad specimens that are, perhaps, best described as microscopic mummies.

Hansma has nonetheless observed the progress of a biochemical reaction by using an improvement on the tunnel microscope.

Invented by Gerd Binnig and two US colleagues, it is known as an atomic force microscope because it harnesses the repellant power between atoms.

In place of the tunnel tip the atomic force microscope uses a tiny diamond attached to a spring as its proboscis. Like a record-player needle this diamond "feels" its way round the structure of a surface.

As the force the microscope applies to the specimen is less than that used by an electron tunnel microscope, specimens examined can be even more fragile.

How is the immeasurably minute movement registered? Physicists initially had to use a tunnel microscope to record the movements of the spring. They can now do so optically.

Hansma and his colleagues have used the atomic force microscope to make the creation of a protein, fibrin, visible. Fibrin is the protein that makes blood clot.

It is a gigantic, net-shaped molecule in which blood corpuscles are caught like fish. Its components, fibrinogen molecules, are interlinked under the influence of oxygen.

The microscopic pictures taken by the Californian scientists show how links in the chain are joined to form several long chains and finally networked to clot blood.

Continued on page 9

■ COMPUTERS

Four megabits and now onwards to 64

Frankfurter Rundschau

IBM Germany have just started manufacturing Europe's first four-megabit chip at the company's Böblingen works near Stuttgart.

The new megachip can store the equivalent of 300 typewritten pages on a single 86.5-square-millimetre chip. Its capacity is four times that of the previous best.

It was developed by IBM in Burlington, Mass. German staff are said to have worked as part of the development team in the United States. Mass production of the four-megabit chip has just begun in the United States too.

IBM say they have invested roughly DM500m in Böblingen, buying roughly half the plant and equipment in Europe.

Only extremely advanced components have had to be bought in the United States.

Chancellor Kohl, who pushed the button to start the new assembly line running, stressed in his speech the need for international cooperation.

Technological innovation on the widest possible scale was a crucial prerequisite if one was to stay internationally competitive.



Chipping in . . . Chancellor Kohl (centre) at ceremony to mark start of four-megabit production. (Photo: dpa)

"There is," he said, "a growing realisation that competence and competitive capacity in high-risk advanced technologies can increasingly be achieved only by means of European cooperation."

In this connection the Chancellor mentioned Jessi, the Joint European Submicron Silicon project in which Siemens, Philips and SGS-Thomson had joined forces.

It was aimed at developing the next-but-one chip generation, the 64-megabit chip, by 1996.

Jessi is expected to cost between DM8bn and DM9bn, toward which the public sector is to contribute one third. Oddly enough, IBM Germany applied to take part in the venture but was turned down by the others, all European firms.

Chancellor Kohl said he would welcome cooperation between the partners in Jessi and their counterparts in the corresponding US project, Sematech.

He would like to see IBM play a leading role in this collaboration.

IBM's Herbert Kircher, head of the Böblingen development laboratory, dealt with competition too.

The Europeans, he said, "sadly played a minor role." Ninety per cent of megachips sold last year were made in Japan.

This figure did not take IBM's own production into account, which was strictly for the company's own use.

Herr Kircher said an industrial society could not afford to be so heavily dependent on Japan, which was why IBM was determined to remain the world's leading semiconductor manufacturer.

In this connection the Sematech project, backed by 13 US firms, was of crucial importance. A further seven companies had recently launched another joint project, US Memories.

IBM was contributing its four-megabit technology toward this project. Once component manufacture is under way, early in 1991, IBM technology will be marketed via other companies for the first time ever.

About 600 people work on the IBM chip production line in Böblingen, including roughly 400 who make the one-megabit chips launched in April 1986.

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 July 1989)

Continued from page 8

"A picture says more than 1,000 words," Hansma says, describing the benefit to be derived from these new microscopes. They are the eyes that see worlds invisible to Man.

Man's five senses register only a fraction of the reality that surrounds us. So do the instruments that supply us with such finely-filtered images that are subject to so much interpretation.

No-one can claim to have really seen an atom. But the hills and dales and the colour contrasts on the microscopic images at least tally with the hypothesis that atoms exist.

Barnabas Thwaites

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 23 June 1989)

The battle for the world's chip market

Germany has made good lost ground in semiconductor technology, with IBM manufacturing four-megabit chips in Böblingen and Siemens due to start production before the year is out.

Yet chip specialist Professor Hans-Joachim Queisser is worried. "The Japanese are still gaining ground," he says.

Professor Queisser heads the Max Planck Solid State Research Institute, Stuttgart, and is an internationally acknowledged authority on semiconductors.

He sounded a gloomy note in a talk held at the Stadthalle in Esslingen, near Stuttgart, at the invitation of the local chamber of commerce and industry.

Japan and the United States were waging a chip war in which the Americans were losing ground from one week to the next.

One of the war theatres was Europe, which now had to import 76 per cent of its new computers.

In 1986 US companies accounted for 53 per cent of the European semiconductor market. Last year their share was down to 45 per cent.

During this period Japanese semiconductor manufacturers doubled their share of the European market: from 9.6 to 19.5 per cent.

Europe plays little or no active role in the chip war. "IBM is a US subsidiary," he said, "and Siemens would not have been able to manufacture megachips without Japanese licences."

The top three semiconductor manufacturers are Nec, Toshiba and Hitachi — all Japanese.

US manufacturers such as Texas Instruments and Intel, who used to be leading contenders, have now been relegated to midfield.

Only one European manufacturer, Philips, is in the top ten — and it is last but one.

Generally speaking, financial backing for microelectronics is unpopular in the Federal Republic. When DM100m in taxpayers' money was to be invested in the Siemens-Philips project, vociferous objections were raised.

Yet the coal industry is subsidised to the hilt, receiving between DM12bn and DM15bn a year.

Another reason why Germany "deliberately" disregarded the semiconductor revolution for years is that the first microelectronics "revolution" coincided with a rapid increase in unemployment in the 1970s. Microelectronics has never lost its reputation for being of a jobkiller.

The Europeans are now keen to catch up with the Japanese and Americans (the Jessi project has set out to develop a 64-megabit chip) because even carmakers and their suppliers would otherwise be liable to blackmail, Professor Queisser says.

They certainly have no choice but to try and close the gap, he feels. He is a member of the supervisory board at Bosch.

Semiconductor technology can no longer be compared with a component you simply buy from a supplier. Machine tool manufacturers will need to divulge to chipmakers their systems know-how if they are to use the new technologies.

"That," he says, "is where it becomes dangerous." Germany has been unable to persuade Japanese or US semiconductor manufacturers to locate in Germany; they prefer Spain. In 10 years Spain would be the centre of microelectronics in Europe.

Eckehart Rotter

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 22 June 1989)

■ THE MEDIA

European television prepares to hit back at the Dallas syndrome

The European Community will soon have another task on its hands. In autumn the promotion of film and television productions will be ceremoniously raised to the rank of a Community project, probably under the tutelage of the EC Commission.

A conference in Paris at the end of September, *Assises de l'Audiovisuel*, *will confirm that the European film* world and television are in a bad way. European cultural identity is endangered by a flood of American TV series, Japanese cartoon films and Brazilian televised novels.

The European Community has in mind a pan-European project for the promotion of audio-visual productions to help the situation — something along the lines of the Eureka Project in the technological field.

At two government summits EC heads of government have made the point that something must be done to strengthen European television productions — "Audio-visual Eureka" is the answer.

However, four months before the beginning of the Paris conference on film and television no-one seems to know precisely what it means.

As Jean Dondelinger, EC Commissioner responsible for media policies, says: "There is no precise definition of Audio-visual Eureka. One has to be careful that the conference in Paris does not get turned into a media event."

A senior executive of Ufa, the film production and distribution subsidiary of the media giant, Bertelsmann, said: "Audio-visual Eureka? I've never heard of it. Generally speaking we are in favour of the state keeping out of things. We can deal with the Americans on our own."

But others already have more exact ideas about what they want to achieve with a programme, culturally trimmed, for the creation of competitive European media industries.

Earlier than most Italian TV czar Silvio Berlusconi has begun to sing the praises of European culture.

The man who pumps the ether full with advertising and American programmes muses a lot about the threat to Europe's cultural identity and advocates a forceful policy towards the Americans.

He and others go along with the idea of Audio-visual Eureka because it fits in with their plans. Like Berlusconi's Fininvest, the major commercial networks in Europe are beginning with vertical integration.

Now they have carved out for themselves a stable market position at home and have purchased other commercial stations abroad, they can begin considering producing their own films and programmes.

The companies needed for that purpose are being bought up. Cash is no problem.

An EC Commission study on Europe's audio-visual industry says that within a few years, the entire market will be shared the market.

To do this they are pursuing different strategies:

- battle for viewer rating figures, which guarantee advertising cash. It is waged with cheap imported series.
- the diversification policies of the print media and others. In Europe the first to get into the TV business was newspaper mogul Rupert Murdoch. Now in every country of Europe banks, water works and construction companies are buying into commercial stations.
- the step by step adjustment of their own production to demand. Having captured transmission time and ensured advertising income this involves improving their image, and making it distinctive, by using more of their own productions or programmes of European origin, and gaining cost advantages by vertical integration.

Berlusconi and successful German commercial stations concentrate on this very point. The moaning about Coca-Cola and Dallas culture is used pointedly to structure anew the tattered, and less powerful, European market for films and TV programmes and if possible get hold of subsidies.

Naturally the dominance of American production is impressive. America supplies 45 per cent of TV programmes imported by Europe and 60 per cent of films. The percentage is considerably higher for TV series.

The world market for TV films and programmes is valued at about six billion marks. Half of that figure is accounted for by European imports, of which four-fifths are American productions. Intra-European sales only account for eight per cent of the world market.

The most important factor contributing to American dominance is the low prices. But the European industry actually turns out twice as many films and

DIE ZEIT

other programmes as the Americans at a lower. Yet a run of US series was offered recently at 15 per cent of the price which the European competition demanded.

The explanation is that three-quarters of American production costs are grossed on the American market. Sometimes costs are covered entirely there. Earnings from exports are more or less a bonus.

In the meantime prices have risen because in Europe public and commercial television channels compete keenly with each other for the most popular TV series. The commercial channels as well battle among themselves for these series.

In addition, since the end of the war, the Americans have regarded their TV and film industry not as a cultural but as purely an economic-political asset:

Those responsible for media matters have been appointed personnally by presidents:

Film and TV exports were, and are, part of a far-reaching strategy, like grain exports. Just as the Americans have induced Japanese and Africans to eat wheat instead of rice or millet, they have schooled the world to consumer American film and TV products. People have got used to these products. They are dependent on them.

Then finally there is a point, not entirely flattering for Europe, about the popularity of programmes from abroad which ought not to be concealed.

In a self-critical analysis of the international TV scene the French magazine *Cinémaction-Télérama* wrote: "It is enough to compare the slow pace and superfluous dialogue of French productions with fast-paced American TV series." The word "French" can confidently be replaced with "European."

American TV series are not just cheaper they are more attractive. Because they ensure high viewer figures they are also more profitable, if dearer, than European productions.

The European market for TV productions is still not very large. It accounts for about one per cent of the EC gross national product. But it is one of the most dynamic.

Since 1983 the average annual growth rate has been 16 per cent, more than computer software.

The European industry is not pleased at leaving a large proportion of future television viewing time in the hands of the Americans.

Besides there is the close relationship to new technical developments, mainly High-Density Television (HDTV). This will not only be the television of the future but also provide key technology, applicable to everything from medicine to arms production.

The EC battles doggedly against Japanese competition to establish its own HDTV standards as international norms. The film and TV industry is an important instrument for achieving this.

A country or region which cannot offer its own films and TV series, produced by their own technology, cannot hope to push through their own standards or norms.

This is why the French and the EC Commission want to make HDTV a factor of Audio-visual Eureka, as well as political and financial support measures, which High-Density Television in the EC already enjoys.

In May France's Minister for the Arts, Jack Lang, placed a memo before his European colleagues, outlining the aims of the Audio-visual Eureka project as he saw them.

In the memo there was not much talk of European cultural values, usually conjured up, but much more about the formation of a "strong and structured European film and TV programme industry."

The French Minister suggested that at the Paris conference in September decisions should be made for "a long-term strategy for the organisation and development of European audio-visual industries." He said that a "decisive attitude on the offensive" was essential.

Not everyone is so enthusiastic to do battle as the French. Not every producer and script-writer wants to be "organised and structured."

Audio-visual Eureka also has a political dimension. Poland and Hungary have already been invited to Paris and have accepted.

At the last EC Arts Ministers Council meeting representatives of governments and opposition parties got together with the Spanish Minister, Jorge Semprun, Jack Lang and Melina Mercouri, the Greek Minister for the Arts.

Representatives from government and the opposition camps also took part in the final press conference, a unique event.

Cultural cooperation with Poland and Hungary, with the Soviet Union and the GDR as well, could pioneer an approach of the East Bloc countries to the EC. There is a possibility that the GDR will be invited to Paris as well.

The aims of Audio-visual Eureka are to be welcomed from a foreign policy point of view, so creating the possibilities for cooperation. The EC already has the Media programme which obviously functions well.

There is a film bureau in Hamburg which is successfully involved in the distribution of low-budget films: scriptwriters and multi-lingual productions are promoted. Independent productions are supported which *have* difficulty getting distribution.

Media is also responsible for creating a fund for films as well as providing training to deal with new techniques such as computerised pictures or HDTV.

Without having loads of money at its disposal Media has already achieved much in overcoming linguistic and cultural barriers in Europe, and thereby promoting competitiveness.

Paris raises only one question here. The French believe that the funds available are inadequate. This sounds as if Audio-visual Eureka should become an organisation, which impresses mainly as a new subsidy source.

The question is also being asked, why a state-financed programme should promote a "coordinated rise of the data about viewing figures in Europe," as mentioned in the memo from Jack Lang.

Media groups can confidently be left to themselves to worry about this data. They need it to bolster their performance, so as to sell more advertising.

The increasing criticism in France on the rigid importance given to viewing figures has obviously not yet reached the French government. The government sees the extension of this Audio-visual Eureka idea to the whole of Europe as a test case for setting up a marketable, competitive Euro-TV preserve.

The consequences should be drawn at least of the questionable opening up of the media, which has given consumers the enormous advantage of being able to follow the same American TV series on more channels, indicating that care is needed in intervening into the audio-visual world.

There can be no objection against cooperation in Europe which primarily helps those who are short of cash. But the media conglomerates, already become dubiously large, must definitely not be helped by the formation of the software market — they are already firmly there.

A well-organised European programmes industry will in the long-term limit the dependence on US imports. But what does this do to safeguard European identity, which should be the fundamental motive behind the total Eureka function?

The EC Commission points out certain risks with regard to the contents. A survey report stated: "One runs the danger of devising and producing programmes which are derived from the Americans and which show no specific advantage."

Frédéric Younge of the French Society of Authors summed this up by saying: "The American danger stems not from American culture, but in the fact that it imposes television programmes which have been produced solely with commerial ends in mind — with the consequences for the contents." Europe is on the best way there.

Thomas Hanke

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 16 June 1989)

■ FILM FESTIVALS

Riceballs and bathtubs and zones-of-inertia parties



She sits in one of those old-fashioned bathtubs which have high legs. Sometimes she stretches one of her own long legs out of the tub and sometimes the other.

He is hunched-up on the bed. He would like her to be on the bed as well. But she remains in the bath and talks on about God and the world and about money, which they do not have and whether it would make them happy if they did.

They talk at length about the riceballs of a girlfriend who has invited them to dinner but who cannot cook.

The problem becomes more trivial when the girlfriend lets them know that she is unable to have them round after all.

At this point Dave, the man, picks up the New York telephone book and reads from it to Sam, whom he has just married. He is searching for a restaurant.

This is a scene from *Prisoners of Inertia*, one of the beautiful discoveries from independent American film-makers at this year's Munich Film Festival.

The film theatens to blurt everything out, but it does quite the opposite. The camera hovers over New York like a bird from the skies, to find finally, after a long flight over the roofs and backyards of Greenwich Village, a window in a brick wall festooned with vines. The camera hovers around it.

Its an opening like René Clair's *Sous les toits de Paris*, and deals with the same thing: the Clair characters dreamt of a honeymoon in Paris.

Dave is eventually successful in enticing the lady of his heart from the bath tub with the suggestion that on this Sunday morning they look for a really interesting supermarket in Hoboken on the other side of the Hudson River. They would also have the opportunity of picking up the wedding photos from a photographer who lived just round the corner.

In between the scenes there are text inserts describing what had happened in the meantime.

Eventually Dave presents his supermarket to his bride with the words "That is America," having in mind mainly a giant red can with "Benzel's Bretzels" on it.

Good provisions for a journey through the zones of inertia in and around New York.

They arrive at an intellectual party, where the door opens on one of the hosts pretending to be amusing.

Late in the night they are in a car belonging to one of the guests, who, obviously a dealer, drops them off in no-man's land, right outside the city.

The faces could not be more tired and the rear lights of a single car are a sad sign of this terminus.

To cut this narrative short, the story of our newly-weds ends happily. A Cuban fisherman takes them in his boat to the middle of the river, where he claimed he had had a vision one day, not forgetting to say an Ave Maria towards heaven. Finally the window in the Village again.

But after all happiness is found despite the inhospitable surroundings. Director Jeffrey Noyes Scher reveals this without great feeling or even being lachrymose.

The dialogue is witty and simple and the camera is the same, with its quite new, unconventional look at the outskirts of Manhattan.

Evidently inertia, or the inability to feel anything, is not so great that you forget your sense of humour.

It is not easy to bring together a series such as the "Independents" which Ulla Rapp has organised with such care and attention for this year's Munich Film Festival.

On the one hand the richness of unconventional, independent films under the influence of Hollywood and television cannot become exacty greater. On the other hand the next Festival is waiting for the presentation of the best minor works, then with more than just a national interest.

It is fortunate if, as in Cannes with all its hurley-burley, not everyone in the festival audiences had noticed a beautiful film and could cast a glance on a work which has something to say.

Sidewalk Stories, for instance, the first full-length film by the black film-maker from New York, Charles Lane, who has studied the film at New York University and who won a student Oscar as long ago as 1976.

He risks the astonishing. Obviously in homage to Charlie Chaplin's *The Kid* he has made a film about homeless blacks in New York.

In view of such films the demands raised by Edgar Reiz (*Heimat* director) at a Film Festival discussion were justified, that the young language of the film must continue to renew itself.

In Munich Charles Lane's *Sidewalk Stories* was accompanied by similar films about homelessness, that painful reverse side of the American dream.

Izak Ben-Meir ventured into a depressing documentation of the homeless inferno of Los Angeles, where death was an ever-present threat.

Promises to Keep shows how important it is to play cleverly on the keyboard of the media film, a documentation of the establishment of a hostel for the homeless directly opposite the White House in Washington.

Cinny Durrin, a director from Washington, gives encouragement to the least fortunate in our society through the example of Mitch Synder, the political leader for the homeless. Her cinematic receipt for successful protest promptly forestalled a Hollywood treatment of the same material.

There was not much trace of pugnacity against Hollywood among American film-makers, who do not produce in the studios of the seven major American companies, but who, with little cash, safegard their own right to authorship, cutting and casting.

There are some independent film-makers, affectionately called "Indies," who do have Hollywood in their sights, but there are equally those who have turned their back on it.

They cannot endure it there, said script-writer Julia Cameron, after ten years experience in the Dream Factory. She works with her husband, Martin Scorsese.

It is a matter of temperament whether one wants to work in Hollywood or not.

Her divine comedy *God's Will*, produced by her own Chicago-based company, is hardly any different in its charming talkativeness from early Hollywood comedies.

Quite a different director, who left Hollywood at the beginning of the 1980s, presented his latest film in Munich, *Street of no Return*. In his new film he has given a main role to the independent director Alexandre Rockwell.

The director is Sam Fuller, who will be 77 on 21 August and whose Havana cigar is rarely extinguished.

He has influenced generations of young directors, including German directors such as Fassbinder and Wenders, with his succinct scenes and even more from his appearances uninfluenced by producers' rules.

Together In *Street of no Return*

(Photo: NEF 2)

Rockwell put him in his film *Sons*, one of many monuments to him, and Wenders before him did the same in *Stand der Dinge*. The film has the effect of a declaration of love for "good old Europe," and for European films.

Four Americans travel to Paris then to the beaches of Normandy. They are three sons and their father in a wheel-chair, who wants to see again his great love from the days of the American invasion of Europe.

As if it were a melodrama from Fuller himself the comic, bizarre tour is a success. The old man can put his arms around Stéphane Audran on the the gray beach.

Then the audience sees the sons shovelling earth into a grave, for the venerable gentleman has had a stroke at the goal of his journey.

This journey in the better days of victory, which summoned up the American pioneer spirit, and ironically made fun of them, was the most detailed of the Munich films.

All the small first films from American directors were street or road movies.

In the course of a day or a journey they tried to wring out of all the futility and impotency of the problems of this world a melancholy feeling of being alive. And they do this with skill and an economy of gesture.

Despite many failures, which are not concealed, despite boldness, all too rare, and unconventional expressions, the *Indies* have not disappointed, even this year.

And this even through the draw to Hollywood gets more irresistible all the time.

Wilfried Geldner

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 5 July 1989)

A Stuttgarter in Brazil

Continued from page 7

In Wolfgang Sauer's view the decision to appoint, as his successor, South African Noel Phillips, 55, until now head of Volkswagen's operations in the USA, was "a good decision."

On politics, he said that Fernando Collar de Mello would probably win the race for the presidency in November. Opinion polls were putting him way ahead of anyone else.

He thinks conservatively, is critical of protectionism and welcomes capital from abroad.

Sauer and other leaders of industry got to know Collar, who is only 39, better over a lunch in Sao Paulo mid-June.

He said: "I'm impressed by him. Collar knows what he is talking about. A few months ago we thought we would get a left-wing president. That's how quickly the situation changes."

On Brazil he said: "Still a country of the future." Sauer pointed to the enormous domestic market, 142 million people, the massive natural resources, the enormous potential for development.

He pointed to the flexibility of the population, demonstrated by the black economy.

Millions of Brazilians earn a living without having a regular employer. They represent perhaps 40 per cent of the gross national product.

"That's how this nation survives. I am certain that many purchasers of Volkswagens come from this class."

Sauer is leaving the top job at Autolatina at his own request. "I've always wanted to stop when I reached 59. I've never wanted to greet my successor with a walking stick in my hand," he said.

He is happy that the pace of his life is quietening down, that the 12-hour days are at an end. He can now enjoy more often his place in the country in the state of Sao Paulo. His hobby is riding.

He will be able to stay longer in his old homeland than he did in the past, "a few weeks, not just a few days."

He will remain a resident of Sao Paulo. "I shall not give up entirely," he said, nor could he.

In the future he will serve on the Autolatina advisory committee. For this reason he will still have an office on the executive floor at the Group's headquarters.

Werner Thomas

(Die Welt, Bonn, 1 July 1989)

■ THE ENVIRONMENT

Court out: Europe tries to enforce its guidelines



Environment policy is still treated shabbily by the European Community, with a mere 0.1 per cent of the Community budget spent on environmental protection, as against the 70 per cent or so the common agricultural policy engulfs and devours.

The Federal Republic of Germany unquestionably ranks alongside Denmark and the Netherlands as a member-country that pursues environmental policies of its own. But that does not, by any stretch of the imagination, mean Bonn is a paragon of good ecological behaviour.

The European Commission is currently engaged in legal proceedings against the Federal Republic in between 20 and 30 cases, arguing that Bonn is in breach of existing environmental regulations in force within the European Community.

"In economic terms the Federal Republic is unquestionably the most powerful member-country," says Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, director-general of the European Commission in charge of the environment. "But where there is so much light," he adds, "there is a corresponding amount of dark."

In absolute terms the Federal Republic is not only the largest economic power in the Community; it is also the foremost environmental pollution offender.

"Bonn thus has a leading role to play both in setting up the European internal market," Brinkhorst says, "and in ensuring environmental protection."

Bonn is finding it hard to live up to the pioneering role in which it has been cast. Demonstrably so in view of the cases in which it has been taken to the European Court of Justice charged with offences against, or inadequate enforcement of, Community law.

The most serious instance is in connection with the European Community guideline on drinking water, which specifies ceilings for individual toxins.

"The guideline was issued in 1980 after five years of talks, agreement finally having been reached after over 50 sessions," says Ludwig Krämer, who is in charge of ensuring that environmental protection guidelines are enforced.

Member-countries then had two years grace in which to amend their national legislation. The Federal Republic did not do so until 1986.

Bonn was not just four years late; it also decreed a further transition period — until October 1989 — for certain pesticides.

Where another Community guideline governing atmospheric lead is concerned, the Commission complains that the Federal Republic has not only failed to enact binding national ceilings.

Even though Community ceilings have been found to be exceeded in certain parts of the Federal Republic there is not even a comprehensive country-wide network of measuring stations.

Protection of birds is an issue on which the European Commission is taking Bonn to court for a second time. One of the points at issue is plans to build dikes across a North German bay that is an important nesting area for many species.

The Commission says the plans as they stand are inadequate to ensure protection of nesting species. "The dikes as proposed would destroy 40 per cent of the bay," Herr Krämer says, explaining why the Commission is taking Bonn to court.

"It isn't just to protect the coastline but to ensure agricultural drainage, improve local fishing and promote tourism. Brussels is quite clear on this point. Bird life must be given priority."

There is a long list of breaches of environmental protection guidelines. "What upsets me," the Brussels legal expert says, "is the way in which Community law is deliberately contravened.

"When the Federal Republic unilaterally scraps guidelines it has earlier formally acknowledged and, in the case of the drinking water guideline, explicitly states in fresh legislation that it will not be bound by Brussels agreements, that is a blow at the substance of the Community.

"It testifies to a lack of awareness that Community law is a legal system that must be respected."

Herr Krämer will hear nothing of claims, frequently made in the Federal Republic, that Brussels in effect slows the pace of environmental protection.

In summer 1987, he says, Bonn Environment Minister Klaus Töpfer drew up a ban on the use of pentachlorphenol (PCP), a substance the Federal government considers to be harmful to the environment.

The Commission said it too was planning guideline proposals on PCP and instructed Bonn to shelve its proposals for 12 months.

"If the Commission fails to submit proposals within 12 months, the Federal government is entitled to issue and enforce regulations of its own," Herr Krämer says.

"That is exactly what happened. This 12-month period expired last summer, in 1988, yet Professor Töpfer has still not banned PCP."

"Two examples are invariably mentioned in the Federal Republic as showing how the European Community nips German initiative in the bud," says Pascale Kromarek of the European Environment Policy Institute.

One is vehicle emission, the other radioactive bombardment of foodstuffs. Environmental guidelines already apply in roughly 100 cases, so these two are merely two out of many."

If it wanted to do so, the Federal Republic could easily pioneer or be a driving force behind environmental protection. Maybe Bonn is reluctant to make the move; maybe it prefers not to "do the dirty" on German industry.

At the Environment Ministry in Bonn, officials disagree. They are naturally unhappy at having been caught out in so many cases, but most are said to be mere formalities.

"It is incredibly difficult to include European Community regulations in an organic legal system," says Martin Seidel of the Economic Affairs Ministry.

"The difficulty is that the *Länder* are responsible for enforcing them."

He represents the Federal government in this case before the European Court of Justice. In his view Community law lacks the necessary clarity. Member-states make full use of the opportunities this presents.

"That," he says, "is why cases taken to the European Court of Justice are all test cases."

Their purpose is to clarify the borderlines. Laws will not be accepted by everyone until the court's rulings are open to no further interpretation.

Sabine Meyer
(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 10 June 1989)

Toxic-waste controls toughened up

Toxic waste regulations have been beefed up by the Bonn government to ensure environment-friendly waste disposal and stricter checks.

The controversial present procedure involves bills of lading for "special waste." It is to be replaced by what is hoped will be a more foolproof arrangement.

In future, toxic waste disposal will only be permitted if there has been shown to be no other way of handling it. The authorities must then be notified of exactly where it is to go.

Environment Minister Klaus Töpfer says the new provisions are the first of their kind in the world.

The next step is to harmonise waste disposal arrangements in the European Community. Harmonisation must precede free trade in waste, he said, with a glance in the Economic Affairs Minister's direction.

There could be no question of a single European market in which where waste could be disposed of least expensively was what counted, as opposed to where waste disposal was environment-friendliest.

One consequence of the new regulations approved by the Bonn Cabinet is that waste in the toxic category is likely to increase in quantity from five to 15 million tons a year.

Ninety categories of waste used to be classified as "special," or toxic. Now there will be 350.

That will lead to more waste needing treatment prior to dumping. Far larger amounts seem sure to be incinerated.

Professor Töpfer admits there aren't enough incinerators at present. 1.8 million tons of toxic waste a year could be incinerated, but only 700,000 tons can be handled by existing facilities.

Professor Töpfer hopes more incinerators will be built. His aim is to enable 1.4 million tons a year to be incinerated.

This presupposes swifter planning permission being granted by the *Länder* to build garbage incinerators, so the government's proposals are likely to have a sticky passage through the Bundesrat.

The Bundesrat, or upper house of the German Bundestag, consists of representatives of the *Länder*. Professor Töpfer anticipates "tough deliberations."

Environmentalists are unhappy with the idea of more toxic waste being incinerated. One ecological pep group, the BBU, says highly toxic substances are released from incinerator smokestacks that cannot be kept in check.

Further regulations are planned to stem the tide of illegal toxic waste "exports." The aim is to prevent combustible toxic waste being classified as fuel and shipped abroad for lower-cost disposal.

Professor Töpfer feels the new regulations should provide an incentive to prevent or to recycle toxic waste. So he expects exports to decline.

Roughly one seventh of the Federal Republic's toxic waste is shipped either to the GDR or abroad.

In autumn he plans to submit further proposals. All aspects of toxic waste disposal will then have been covered.

The next set of regulations will specify static emission ceilings for incinerator plants.

Ulrich Reitz
(Die Welt, Bonn, 29 June 1989)

Losing sight of the arguments in the mists of technology

European Community Environment Ministers recently agreed on new emission ceilings for small cars. They seem likely to change their minds again soon.

Environmentalists breathed a sigh of relief when the Council of Ministers finally agreed on stricter emission limits for small cars from 1993.

At long last, they read in their newspapers, the compact models preferred by so many motorists would need to be fitted out with catalytic converters, which were the best available pollution control technique.

Did that mean the end of bargaining over each gram per cubic metre of exhaust gas? And was Europe finally destined to draw level with US emission control legislation?

The answer is neither the one nor the other. Current US specifications are stricter than the ones that are not to apply to new cars in the European Community until three and a half years hence.

For one, nitric oxides are to continue to be limited together with unburnt hydrocarbons, which is an unwarranted bonus for the motor industry.

For another, the prospective European Community standards will only have to be complied with by prototypes and will, even then, be much less stringent than US specifications.

The ceilings will be over 100 per cent less exacting for hydrocarbons and about 35 per cent less for carbon monoxide.

Assembly line models will be even less environment-friendly. Last but least, series models will be allowed to exceed the limit by up to 16 per cent.

So while President Bush is planning a further reduction in vehicle emission as a source of environmental pollution, European Community legislation will not even draw level with US legislation that has been in force for 10 years.

So much for European pledges on strict environmental protection. Even so, the last word has not yet been said on the subject. The Community plans to amend the test cycles that are used to ascertain pollution levels.

The city cycle is to be extended to include an unrealistic high-speed phase at which engines will run at 120kph (75mph) for a few seconds.

The European Commission is right in wanting to gear test cycles more strictly

Continued on page 15

■ HEALTH

Family therapy: it's unpopular, it's popular and it has the wrong name

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG

Family therapy has gained more recognition and grown more widespread in the past 15 years than virtually any other branch of psychotherapy.

Over 20 training centres have been set up in Germany, six scientific journals have been launched, and family therapy has firmly established itself in all new psychology textbooks and at most therapeutic facilities.

This boom can arguably be compared with the avalanche-like spread of psychoanalysis in the first decades of the century.

It is hardly surprising that some therapists are talking in terms of a Copernican change in psychotherapy.

They see it as being on a par with the discovery by the Polish astronomer, in the mid-16th century, that the planets revolve round their own axes — and round the Sun.

What is the fundamental idea on which family therapy is based? Complaints that are attributable to a state of mind which leads, say, to an ulcer or to a suicide attempt have traditionally been regarded as a problem faced by the individual alone.

What is new about family therapy is the assumption that the complaint is due, at least in part, to family relationships.

If treatment is to succeed, the entire family must gather round the therapist's table.

The therapist works on the assumption that the individual's complaint will be cured if the rules by which the family members get on with each other are changed.

Stimulated by general systems theory and automatic control technology, family therapists have come to see the family as a network of relationships that is more than the sum total of individual relationships.

It is, they feel, a stable unit in which rules apply that are accepted by all.

Family therapy was controversial from the start, and not just in Germany. In the United States a fully-fledged movement has emerged to mobilise opposition to family therapy.

The National Association of the Mentally Ill (NAMI) has 60,000 members, most of whom are opposed, in the wake of unsatisfactory personal experience, to the "pathologisation" of their families.

The concept of family therapy implies, in their view, that the family alone is to blame when members fall mentally or psychosomatically ill.

Helm Stierlin, head of the department of basic psychoanalytical research and family therapy at Heidelberg University, says this criticism is unjustified because it fails to take recent developments in family therapy into account.

Professor Stierlin, who is considered to have been one of the founding fathers of family therapy in the Federal Republic of Germany, says:

"I feel the concept of family therapy is problematic nowadays. It no longer hits the nail on the head. It would be better to refer to systemic therapy."

The family has been regarded as a system, but in practice this approach has been found to be a limitation. A social worker who has been visiting a mother for years in connection with a "difficult" or "problem" child can also be partly to blame for the child remaining a "problem case."

So the social worker must be included as part of the system that has caused the child's complaint. Professor Stierlin thus argues that the family therapist's first task is to find out who other than the immediate members of the family, which remains the nucleus by virtue of emotional ties, forms part of the problem system.

"It needn't be the family," he says. "It can be a couple or an individual. Teachers, social workers, solicitors and doctors may also have to be included in therapeutic considerations."

But this extension of the terms of reference has yet to gain widespread acceptance.

What form does therapy take? How does a therapist set about it? A case in question is that of a mother who wants to go back to work now she no longer needs to look after the grandparents, who have died.

Her 16-year-old daughter now suffers from anorexia, and every meal is a battlefield, with the girl's parents urging her to eat more.

This conflict escalates and the parents seek therapeutic advice. In a first discussion the therapist surmises that the daughter's anorexia is an attempt to tie down a mother who is keen to go back to work.

The therapist outlines to the family his interpretation of the situation and instructs them not to change their behaviour before the next session.

As a next step the parents are told not to criticise their daughter's eating habits on more than one day in the week. After further sessions the daughter ends her "hunger strike."

What has happened? The family therapist has tried to channel the discussion in such a way as to enable members of the family to gain a new insight into their situation within the family and to open up new options.

This treatment is backed up by minor "instructions" designed to change behaviour patterns that have grown hard and fast.

Therapists often use a ploy known as paradoxical intervention. It involves instructions such as: "Don't, whatever you do, change your behaviour."

Professor Stierlin sees no point in distinguishing between healthy and sick families. There is, he says, no way of ascertaining what is objectively sick or healthy.

Family therapists refer instead to functional and dysfunctional systems. Their concern is thus to ensure that the family functions; they have no intention of putting a family ideal into practice by means of therapy.

In order to analyse complicated processes that take place within a system therapists have drawn up rules according to which relationship systems work.

Within a family there must, for instance, be a balance between proximity and distance between individuals. There must be borderlines between individuals to enable them to develop individual personalities.

A family also needs the ability to solve problems such as arise when children leave home to live lives of their own.

The therapist's role has undergone a fundamental change in Professor Stierlin's concept.

Psychoanalysts have sought, at many sessions and in courses of treatment lasting years, to penetrate the subconscious of the individual.

Professor Stierlin sees himself as a counsellor whose job is to shed light on the family from outside in a dozen sessions at most, with no more than a few weeks between each session.

"The crucial processing of conflicts must be part of the system itself — of the family — rather than take place at the therapy session."

Reiner Straub
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 1 July 1989)

Schoolchildren given too much medicine, says report

German schoolchildren are given too much medicine too often and too soon by their parents, says a survey commissioned from a Dortmund health and education centre by the North Rhine-Westphalian Health Ministry in Düsseldorf.

Ninety-six per cent of a cross-section sample consisting of 2,000 mothers in North Rhine-Westphalia said they were satisfied with the health of their children, aged between six and fourteen.

Yet 28.6 per cent plied their children during the period under review with patent medicines to treat or cure coughs and colds, allergies and roughly 30 other complaints.

Interestingly, over half the children concerned were not acutely ill during the period in question.

Mothers most often justified medication by saying their children's behaviour was strikingly different.

Forty per cent of mothers questioned mentioned at least one behavioural peculiarity, the most frequent mention being given to lack of concentration, fidgeting, headaches, stomach ache and insomnia.

Far too often, or so the authors of the survey feel, mothers fail to appreciate that the symptoms they observe are not organic in origin.

In many cases they are a consequence of mental strain on the child's part. So medication is not going to make matters better.

Stress at school frequently triggers the behaviour that worries mothers. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with prowess or performance at school can contribute heavily to a child's mental strain or relief.

A child whose showing at school is, for whatever reason, not what its parents would expect can be sure to be heavily pressured to do better.

This pressure grows increasingly heavy in relation to the educational qualifications parents expect their children to achieve.

Children from families with per capita monthly incomes of DM1,000 and more have 60 per cent more spent on medicine for them than children from families with less than DM500 per head per month.

The Dortmund research team say these figures reflect the ambition felt by



middle-class parents to make sure their children are fit to face the earnest of adulthood.

A point which is felt to be particularly worrisome is that nearly one child in four is plied with pills, tablets and liquids without professional medical advice.

Overtaxed teachers refer "problem pupils" to doctors. Parents ply their children with patent medicines to make them fit to meet society's challenges.

The trend, as the Dortmund team see it, is thus toward ever larger numbers of people having to live with pills as a means of avoiding conflict and of ensuring their ability to hold their own with others.

Many children have grown accustomed to their mothers having up to three different kinds of tablet at the ready and to their fathers needing to pop a pill after drinking.

They have grown used to more and more grown-ups expecting pills to work as a pick-me-up when they are in a bad mood or face problems large or small — or simply to enable them to keep abreast of work.

It is hardly surprising that staff at children's summer camps say most children are given a small assortment of pills and tablets to bring with them.

The examples parents set teach young children a pattern of solving conflicts and coping with illness they will never forget.

They — the children — run a risk of being taught to pop pills as an addiction and of being made unable to recognise signals sent out by a healthy body as reactions to environmental stimuli that make them ill.

The Dortmund scientists feel medication as a means of treating children's minor upsets is dangerous as a matter of principle.

Children's unusual behaviour is not seen as a sign of a disturbed environment or as an opportunity to act differently.

Medication as a means of treating symptoms may lead to short-term success, but in the long term it can only do harm to the individual and to his environment.

In the final analysis the conclusion to be reached is that pill-popping or tablet-sucking is not the right way to solve problems.

Diethard Geber
(Saarbrücker Zeitung, 22 June 1989)

The divided city of Berlin is an anomaly that is full of anomalies. The Wall dividing West Berlin from East Berlin — and hence from the rest of the East Bloc — is an East German invention. The East Germans control it. West Berlin does not recognise it as a valid international border. To make that point, it does not police border checkpoints. Checks on who comes through and what they do are carried out inside West Berlin itself. So if Poles want to make a weekend trip to West Berlin — the Polish border is less than 50 miles from Berlin as the crow flies — and if their papers are in order, their is nothing to stop them. They simply go by car or by train and U-Bahn. If cars and suitcases are packed with saleable commodities, there is no one on the western side of the city border to ask questions. The papers are only checked on the eastern side. Poles are, in any case, allowed to make 31 visits a year to West Berlin without a visa. Of course, they come as tourists, not as traders. Out of these East-West facts of life and a Polish entrepreneurial instinct developed a Berlin phenomenon known as the Polish Market. The market site lies outside the apex of a triangle of empty land, the base of which is formed by the Wall at Potsdamer Platz. Until recently, this piece of land was ineffectively fenced off as if perhaps reserved for a property developer. No such thing. The land belonged to East Germany although it is on the western side of the Wall. You could walk through this part of the East Bloc without a visa. Not long ago, East Berlin and West Berlin exchanged ownership of several anomalous fingers of land not delineated by the Wall. The triangle by the Polish market now belongs to the West. That's Berlin. The market itself was to be a short-lived phenomenon. It survives, but only in truncated form. Otto Jörg Weis tells the story for the Cologne daily, *Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger*.



Deutsche marks for ingenuity . . . the Polish market. (Photo: Mrotzkowski)

■ FRONTIERS

Berlin puts the kibosh on its Polish street market

It is Sunday. Seven in the morning. Three hundred metres from the Wall and not much further from the remains of Hitler's bunker. The Kemperplatz.

Poles. Lots of them. With bulging plastic bags. They have come in their little Fiats. They are drowsy, dishevelled because they have spent the night in them.

Before the war, this area here at the periphery of Kreuzberg was where the swank embassy buildings were. Not far away were the ministry buildings of the Third Reich.

Now, there isn't much left. The Philharmonie, home of the Berlin Philharmonic, is there — it was built in 1963 — and so is an art gallery and a museum; otherwise, just the Wall, dereliction and tourists. A black market operated here 40 years ago amid the ruins of war. But today the customers are not war-weary-Berliners but Turks, many of whom live in Kreuzberg. And the hawkers are Poles.

Polish cigarettes are on sale for 10 marks a carton (German cigarettes cost between 35 and 40 marks a carton); a bottle of vodka costs between three and seven marks; a tin of caviar 15; a set of wooden chessmen plus board 10; there are men's shirts, soldering irons and Christmas decorations. It all comes from Poland.

There is little haggling. The police in mufti could be just around the corner. The day before, 42 Poles had been arrested for "entering the country with the intention of carrying out business." Their passports had been stamped so that they would "never again" be allowed to enter West Berlin.

Poles are allowed to enter West Berlin without visas up to 31 times a year. As a visa costs 50 marks, this is quite a saving. But the condition is that they come as tourists.

Many more used to come. They flooded through the checkpoints and down to the Kemperplatz. The market became an attraction like the Kurfürstendamm and the Reichstag: busloads of tourists would visit it.

It was more than that. For half a year, it became part of an international city where, for years, foxes and hares had the area to themselves. It became a multicultural confusion the like of which had not been seen since the end of the war.

It vibrated like Paris or London — that is, Paris or London down at the bottom. On the Mondays following the weekends, the area looked spectacularly filthy with plastic mats and assorted rubbish from the weekend. Ten thousand people used to come here. There were no lavatories. The city certainly didn't provide any.

Here, Turkish women learned enough broken Polish inside weeks to be able to haggle over pfennigs. Cameras bought by Poles from Russians were sold to Germans to be later resold to Turks.

For a few months, this was an example of what Gorbachov's Common European House might look like for West Berlin. It was as if the divided city was again in central Europe instead of at the edge of the western world.

Poland and Hungary have always belonged to central Europe and today that recognition is part of their understanding of themselves. Berlin and Poland have connections which go back a long way. It is 10 times as far from Berlin to Bonn as it is to the Polish border.

Since the beginning of the year, West Berliners, fenced-in in all directions from the East Bloc by The Wall, have been able to learn a lot from their Polish neighbours. It wasn't as if there were only bands of hawkers "creaming-off" (the expression now used as a justification now that the market is banned); there was the student who made the exhausting weekend trips to finance his medical studies. There was the housewife who spent the night at the railway station (again shades of wartime) to get a place on the packed-out train going home.

They headed back to Poland with urgently needed goods from the West to use or sell (for western currency) in Poland to buy still more urgently needed goods and sell them.

The aim is to get hard currency. Just as in East Germany (or in any other East Bloc country): in Poland you can get almost anything with Western money. That fact of life has created two classes of people — those with western money and those without. But that is at least something.

Fifty marks profit, which can be made on a weekend trading trip to the West, is a month's pay in Poland. Yet it is clear that they don't all enjoy being barrow boys. You can see that from their stony expressions. Many are even ashamed.

A Polish woman aged about 20 explained to a newspaper why they bothered: "If you have an income of 20,000 zloties, how are you meant to live? Ten marks is an income if you convert it at the unofficial rate."

Berlin has for a long time been nothing like Paris or London. The market really did not stand a chance from the beginning. It wasn't the fault of the allied powers. They turned their eyes the other way even though the regulations under which Poles are allowed to visit West Berlin do not allow them to trade.

Neither was the Berlin city government behind the market's removal. The old CDU/FDP administration (voted out at the beginning of the year) fenced off the area and used a few tricks to try and stem the tide, but their efforts were always tinged with feelings of guilt.

The new administration of Social Democrats and Greens at first let things run as they had been. They craftily put forward the view that the Poles just brought enough bric-a-brac to finance their short stay in West Berlin. That meant the traffic was not commercial. So customs regulations did not apply.

The fact is that the Polish traders are small fish. The chamber of trade and industry itself has urged tough action only against "organised" illegal trading. In addition, Berlin, of all places was in view of its post-war history required to be tolerant.

No, the truth is that Berlin's bourgeoisie were the force behind the end of the market. Aroused through certain sections of the Press (the shrill *Bild* applied the term "chaos") the middle classes protested verbally and in writing for the authorities to "rid the *city of this blot*."

Poles are the third biggest foreign grouping in West Berlin. As workers, they are generally welcomed. *Suddenly*, they became "Polaken" once more.

It was said that the Bonn Ministry of Finance had intervened because the market site was becoming an unofficial free-trade area. The Alternative List (Greens) called the entire episode "pathetic."

But the Poles are persisting. There is too much in it for them to give up without a battle. It is true that there are fewer of them, but those that do come are tougher and foxier. More than 1,000 turned up this weekend. Late on the Saturday they descended on the shops in a buying spree. But the atmosphere is now depressing.

Edward Klimzak, head of *Gesellschaft Solidarnosc* in West Berlin, said of the Berlin administration: "I believe they don't like the poor people."

In a side street just off the Kurfürstendamm, a young Pole packs a video-recorder, still in its factory packaging (Made in Singapore) into his little Fiat.

After months of effort, he has reached a cherished goal. But the look on his face seems to suggest disappointment, as if there is a wider aim than the mere acquisition of a video recorder.

Otto Jörg Weis

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 3 July 1989)

Continued from page 7

and Italy. "We have succeeded in increasing the number of orders by a lot," Eyerer said

The old guard in the firm, who were at first sceptical about Eyerer's activities, now say that the step taken was the right one and that the DM12m investment was money well spent.

It was not a matter of course that Eyerer returned to his academic work on 1 July 1988. There were temptations, he admits. That he did not succumb to them was good for the university, good for his institute and good for his students. He said that now he had a different lecturing style, more graphic, more topical. His students are so attentive that a pin can be heard falling on the floor.

His change to industry has made possible dissertations and work on doctorates more related to practical matters.

The fact that the institute is again a kind of industrial undertaking with a budget and people accepting personal responsibilities is the result of Eyerer's work for three years in industry.

Recently the institute's accounts were audited. He said: "We were highly praised because of our intelligibility."

He wrote in his book: "The aim is not to have an avalanche effect, but five to ten professors from every university would give many industrial companies new impulses and in this way considerably improve the competitiveness of medium-sized industries."

But apart from him only two or three colleagues have ventured to make the leap from the ivory tower into the battlefield.

Harald Günter

(Die Welt, Bonn, 24 June 1989)

■ HORIZONS

Ex Olympic yachtsman runs Lufthansa's pilot school



Willy Kuhweide was the Federal Republic's all-time most successful sailor. He has won gold and bronze medals, taken part in the Olympic Games five times, repeatedly been a world champion sailor, and ten times victor at the Kiel Week.

But 1989 will be his first year without a regatta. His profession has taken him to Arizona's desert and there he is set up on dry land.

Close to Phoenix, Arizona, Kuhweide, born in Berlin, has won additional personal successes, for which he was awarded neither medals nor the honours of a sports victor.

The standard bearer of the West German team at the Los Angeles Olympic Games is today head of Lufthansa's pilots' school, which is acknowledged as being one of the best academies for fliers in the world.

After 28 years in competitive sailing Finn Dinghy champion Kuhweide is no longer being called to the starting line, but Captain Kuhweide is wanted in every nook and corner of the training camp.

Basic training for German pilots is not limited just to providing young flying personnel for Lufthansa but is more and more frequently marketed as a service to other airlines.

The pilot school is comparable to the Porsche technical development centre at Weissach. It has enormous investments and an annual budget of DM30m, which is partly covered by the school itself.

Spanish airline Iberia and the largest Japanese airline, ANA, have already sent personnel for training to Litchfield. Negotiations are currently under way with Air France and others.

Unofficially it is said that highly respected Swiss Air will have its flying personnel trained there too.

Kuhweide is proud of the recognition the school is given. He has been building it up for the past ten years and sometimes he meets a former trainee who introduces himself as his co-pilot in flights to Europe in a Boeing 727, which Kuhweide does every 90 days so as not to lose his licence.

The advantages of the remote training camp in the endless distances of Arizona catch the eye immediately: uninhabited areas as large as the Saar, constant good weather, first-class visibility and little air traffic.

When one comes out of the city of Phoenix the dead-straight silver band of Highway 10 gets lost between the desert and blue mountains on the horizon.

The temperature, almost 40 degrees centigrade for eight months of the year, makes the air shimmer. In front of a wooden kiosk the owner sits and dozes, and pulls his broad-brimmed hat over his face as protection against the sun.

When he is really busy he serves ten customers in the morning.

The sky has the incredible blue of postcards with exaggerated colours or Gauguin's late Tahiti pictures.

The earth is dried up; there has not been a drop of rain for 19 weeks.

Without previous warning a notice on the left indicates the road to Litchfield Airport. There are low buildings and a couple of planes on the apron. Then to the right there is a row of bright-yellow, single-engine Bonanzas, training aircraft, lined up with Prussian-like exactitude.

The sign of the Lufthansa school, which to comply with local regulations has an American partner, can be seen modestly to the right, three large capital letters, "DLH," Deutsche Lufthansa, but no crane emblem or the typical Lufthansa lettering. Even in a friendly country the company wants to keep a low profile.

The American flying instructors were recruited by Kuhweide himself and they work meticulously along German guidelines.

Kuhweide's official title is "Manager & Chief Pilot Dept. USA." He is wearing a blue, white and yellow striped short-sleeved shirt. He does the jobs he has to do; deal with three folders of mail, sign cheques and sign documents for the extension of the camp and the establishment of his own airport.

He commented: "Previously it was simpler. We are growing too fast."

The training school's capacity has been increased from 175 to 350 trainees. That calls for larger lecture halls, more accommodation, a new canteen and, above all, more single- and twin-engined planes.

He supervises the organisation, conducts negotiations and is always available as an instructor.

He is regarded by the trainees as a perfectionist, but at a personal level as a man in whom one can confide.

The general verdict on him is that subconsciously one thinks perhaps about his sport achievements, but his authority comes from his ability and his personality.

Kuhweide demands from himself and his trainees constant top performance, but he rejects the "brutal side of performance," as he calls it.

He regards Lufthansa's career planning as ideal: the toughest selection criteria up to being engaged by the airline, then calm instead of wrangling.

He said: "We do not need heroes in flying suits, inclined to the spectacular, but reliable adherents to the system. We ask for nothing spectacular but constant caution and reliability."

Lufthansa's seniority list (within the airline known as the 'senility list') follows these ideas. All pilots have firm contracts and are promoted to the cockpit of the largest, and consequently best paid, planes according to years of service and not according to special qualifications. (The starting salary is about DM6,700. The captain of a Boeing 747 earns about DM20,000 a month.)

Kuhweide regards this as correct because "unlike a career in industry no-one must push and shove and get advantages by using his elbows. It makes for peace and quiet, calls for team spirit and in the final analysis serves the safety of passengers."

Safety is the keyword from the very beginning at Litchfield, and naturally it is drilled in during flights over the prairie and the mountains.

After quite a few flying hours the instructor suts out the engine of the Bonanza so that the trainee gets the feeling for gliding and landing without power.

Planes are even put into a spin when the pilot has enough experience and knows how to keep his nerve.

Kuhweide said: "We talk in a matter-of-fact way about flying performances such as that of the pilot of a jumbo jet, torn open over Hawaii. Our trainees learn from the very beginning to live with extraordinary incidents and how to react coolly."

Cornelia Drössel, one of the two female trainees in this course, amplified this by saying: "We got rid of the anxieties about problem situations in the air during the first course."

Introductory training in theory and in a simulator is provided in Bremen, where future pilots are knocked into shape preparatory to going to Phoenix.

Theoretical and aeronautical training lasts two years or 195 hours in training aircraft as well as 82 hours in the simulator.

Navigation, technology, radio communications and other aspects of flying are drummed into trainees in 1,300 hours in the lecture halls.

The stages of training include the private pilot's licence, commercial pilot's licence, instrument flight rating and airline transport pilot's licence.

There are exceptions but whoever gets a commercial airline pilot's licence is taken on by Lufthansa.

There is then a further introductory course for the Boeing 737. The candidate must again undergo instruction in the simulator and in flight training.

If he gets a licence to fly this type of aircraft he becomes a first officer and can take his seat as co-pilot.

Training costs are high. For the first stage of basic training DM250,000 has to be set aside, but to complete the course Lufthansa reckons that it costs an additional million marks to train a pilot. At first glance this is an enormous amount of money but it certainly pays off.

The trainee must himself pay DM22,000, excluding living costs.

The requirements which candidates must have are the first major hurdle to be surmounted. They must be between 19 and 28, be at least 1.67 metres tall, fit as a fiddle, with good eyesight and a strong constitution.

They must have passed the university entrance examination to be able to take part in highly-qualified pilot training.

The candidate has to go through an aptitude test which includes basic technical knowledge and an acquaintance with the laws of physics. He is questioned about his knowledge of mechanics and electronics, tested for English conversation, and his reactions in complex, dynamic situations as well as for physical capacities.

Ninety per cent of the candidates cannot fulfill the incredibly long list of requirements, and of the ten per cent remaining two per cent fail in the course of the year.

Kuhweide sees in this a confirmation of the sifting out process for taking on pilots.

He said: "One recognises the ripening process of a future pilot if course members come for a second time to Arizona at the end of training. Then the young men and the 15 ladies, who have been able to qualify, conduct themselves confidently and enjoy solo flights. Lufthansa is happy that until now there has been no incident or damage to a training plane."

Nothing is left to chance in the desert. There is a new variation on the "Made in Germany" slogan under the Arizona sun. To Willy Kuhweide this success is as valuable as Olympic victory.

Heinz Horrmann

(Die Welt, Bonn, 23 June 1989)



Plane sailing for Willy Kuhweide. (Photo: Lufthansa)

Continued from page 12

to realistic driving conditions. But hopes of that leading to stricter limits are soon dashed.

The new test cycles will make the ceilings between 10 and 15 per cent less exacting.

The vehicle emission debate is weird enough already. But politicians and the general public now seem sure to be confronted with arguments virtually no-one other than engineers will understand.

Effective environmental protection will, as so often, be the loser.

Some carmakers have already shown how modern engines can well undercut the proposed European Community ceilings.

A Japanese manufacturer, for instance, markets a 1,000-cc compact that improves on the proposed emission ceilings by up to 60 per cent without a catalytic converter.

If it were fitted with a converter this model would perform even better.

The Community is well advised not to specify any-particular emission control technique, but this example will suffice to show that Environment Ministers have chosen to trail well behind what carmakers could do.

Fritz Vorholz

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 23 June 1989)